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CROSSING EIGHT MILE: JURIES OF THE VICINAGE
AND COUNTY-LINE CRIMINAL BUFFER STATUTES
Brian C. Kalt*
Abstract: Several state statutes allow the state to choose the county in which to prosecute
a person who allegedly committed a crime near a county line. Because these buffer statutes
apply even in cases where the location of the crime is not in doubt, they are inappropriate on
two levels. First, they are needless as a matter of policy; other statutes solve all of the
problems that buffers purport to address, but without the detrimental effects. Second, they
conflict with the principle-traditional in some states but constitutionally required in
others--of trial by a jury of the vicinage, i.e., from the neighborhood in which the crime was
committed. While theorists have recently argued that local juries are important because they
allow communities to govern themselves, courts' treatment of buffer statutes makes it clear
that, in practice, vicinage is not considered from this community-centered perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
Eight Mile Road, which separates Detroit from its northern suburbs,
is one of the starkest county lines in the country. The deep divide
between the two sides of the road was depicted powerfully in the movie
8 Mile' and was at the heart of-and exacerbated by-the famous busing
case of Milliken v. Bradley.2 Put simply, Detroit is poor and black.3
Oakland County, north of Eight Mile, is rich and white.4
Clarence Terrell lived in Detroit.5 One day he looked out onto his
front lawn to see two police officers chasing his sister, Kim, and a third
officer striking his sister Kelly hard on the back of her neck.6 Terrell

1. 8 MILE (Universal Pictures 2002).
2. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (rejecting multidistrict busing plan).
3. The 2000 Census indicates that Detroit had a median household income of $29,526 in 1999,
and that eighty-two percent of its residents were black. U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder
(2000), at http://factfinder.census.gov.
4. The Census showed that Oakland County had a median household income of $61,907 in 1999,
and that eighty-three percent of its residents were white. Id. In the movie 8 Mile, the key division
was between Detroit and Macomb County. See 8 MILE, supra note 1. Macomb County is east of
Oakland County, and it is also much whiter (ninety-three percent white) and much richer (median
household income in 1999 of $52,102) than Detroit. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3.
5. Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 1, People v. Terrell (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 1995) (No. 94DA6142-AR) [hereinafter Terrell's Brief]. The title on Terrell's brief is inaccurate; Terrell was the
appellant in the case.
6. Id. at 1-2. The prosecution's brief does not contest the facts recounted here unless otherwise
noted. See Appellee's Brief at iv, People v. Terrell (Mich. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 1995) (No. 94-DA6142AR) [hereinafter Prosecution's Brief].
I encountered this case when it came before Judge Alice Gilbert of Michigan's Sixth Circuit
Court in Oakland County on appeal. I worked for Judge Gilbert in the summer of 1995 after my first
year in law school. The opinions in this Article are not necessarily shared by Judge Gilbert or
anyone else. Indeed, Terrell's attorney did not challenge the statute on any grounds, and, as I recall,
essentially conceded the case when it was brought up.
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attacked the third officer.7 Terrell was not arrested, but some time later
he was charged with misdemeanor assault, for which he was convicted
after a jury trial. 8
Terrell's crime was committed entirely in Detroit, and no one claimed
that a Detroit jury would have been unduly biased. Nevertheless, Terrell
was tried and convicted on the other side of Eight Mile-in Ferndale,
Oakland County, by six Ferndale jurors. 9 One can imagine that the case
might have played differently to a Detroit jury: Femdale's population is
ninety percent white, while Detroit's is eighty percent black; Ferndale's
median household earns over fifty percent more than Detroit's.1° More to
the point, police-citizen relations are very different in the city than they
are in the suburbs, and a scuffle between a Detroiter of any race' and a
suburban policeman would look very different in Detroit than it would in
the suburbs. Not surprisingly, the prosecutors preferred to take the case
to a suburban jury. Terrell appealed his conviction and challenged the
jurisdiction of the Ferndale court.
His appeal failed, though, because his house was only about 1500 feet
south of Eight Mile, and under Michigan law, any crime committed12
within a mile of a county line can be prosecuted in either county.
Eighteen other states, representing with Michigan a majority of the U.S.
have such county-line criminal-jurisdiction or venue
population,
3
statutes.'

7. Terrell's Brief, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that Clarence Terrell "grabbed" officer);
Prosecution's Brief, supra note 6, at iv (stating that Clarence Terrell "jumped on" officer).
8. Terrell's Brief, supra note 5, at 2.
9. Id. at 2. The trial was held in Ferndale because it was the police officers' jurisdiction. One of
the officers had stopped Kim Terrell's car on Eight Mile; rather than produce her driver's license,
Kim fled to her home in Detroit. The officer gave chase, which led to the altercation on the lawn. Id.
10. To be precise, the Census put Femdale's median household income at $45,629 and race at
91.5% white. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3.
11. The record does not reflect the race or income of the Terrells, the police officers, or the jurors.
The Terrells' block on Derby Street-one block away from Eight Mile Road-is seventy percent
black (85 people out of 122). The two blocks immediately on the other side of Eight Mile, in Hazel
Park, have a similar total population and are ninety-five percent white (146 out of 153). (The census
classifies the Terrells' block as #3001 in census tract 5076, and the blocks in Hazel Park as #5013
and #5010 in census tract 1753.) U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3.
12. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 762.3(1) (West 2000). Going due north from the Terrells'
house (on Derby Street), the city on the other side of Eight Mile is Hazel Park, not Ferndale.
Femdale is not far to the west, however, and is less than a mile from the Terrells' house.
13. See infra note 23 and Map A accompanying note 29. For the sake of simplicity, this Article
refers to buffer "statutes" even though, technically, some states provide for buffers in court rules of
criminal procedure rather than in statutes. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 24.02(2).
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As Terrell's case makes clear, these "buffer" statutes are problematic.
States can define their judicial geographical divisions almost any way
they like, of course, but there was no good reason to try Clarence Terrell
across the border, and there were many good reasons not to. States need
to provide for cases in which the location of a crime vis-A-vis a border is
indefinable or unclear, or when a crime's elements are spread over
multiple jurisdictions. Buffer statutes are not a necessary mechanism for
any of these situations, however, and they reward forum shopping by
prosecutors. In short, buffer statutes should be eliminated.
This Article approaches buffer statutes from the perspectives of
policy, law, and theory. As a matter of policy, buffer statutes are
problematic and unnecessary, because there are better alternatives. As a
legal matter, they are inconsistent with traditions of community selfgovernment through local juries. The fact that they persist despite these
shortcomings, however, shows, as a theoretical matter, that courts do not
view local juries as integral to self-government. However, they should.
For all these reasons, buffer statutes should be struck down by courts or
repealed by state legislatures.
Part I of this Article describes the use, history, and justifications for
buffer statutes, and concludes that their advantages are overrated and
minimal at best. This is especially so because there are related statutes,
such as those that expand jurisdiction only when the county of the crime
is in doubt, that achieve the same positive functions without promoting
forum shopping.
Part II discusses another distinct problem with buffer statutes: The
foreign-county trials that buffers permit do not use a jury "of the
vicinage." The vicinage requirement-which requires criminal juries to
be drawn from the place where the crime was committed-is deeply
rooted in the common law, expressly guaranteed in many state
constitutions, and prudent as a principle of democratic self-government.
Because crimes, but not jurors, are drawn from the buffer zones defined
in these statutes, juries in cases that are tried across county borders never
include anyone from the neighborhood in which the crime occurred.
These juries hear cases that do not directly affect their communities. Part
II explores and promotes the vicinage concept, and criticizes buffer
statutes for clashing with it.
Part III critiques the buffer and vicinage question from another, more
theoretical angle. At first glance, buffer statutes might seem to affect
mainly the right of criminal defendants to a jury that comprises a "proper
cross-section" of the community. The same case law that promotes
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defendants' right to jury trial by a "proper cross-section" pays no mind
to buffer statutes, however. These cases overlook the rights of the jurors
themselves and their community. In recent decades, some scholars have
promoted the idea that criminal defendants are not the only ones with a
right to jury trials; the community itself has a right, or at least an interest,
in ensuring that criminal trials are decided by local juries, as a critical
form of self-government. The prevalence with which courts use and
approve buffer statutes shows, however, that this community-centered
conception of the jury has been largely rejected in practice. Courts have
tended to uphold buffer statutes, even in some cases when weighed
against seemingly strict state constitutional guarantees of a jury of the
vicinage. Courts upholding buffer statutes have concentrated instead on
whether a jury is unconstitutionally biased. Even when courts have
struck down these statutes-and none have in the last seven decadesthey have done so on either legal-positivist grounds or on the basis of the
rights of criminal defendants, not on notions of community rights. The
notion that jury trials are an essential component of local selfgovernment is nowhere to be found in these cases. The scholarship on
local juries, compelling as it is, describes a different world than the case
law does, and should be adjusted to account for the case law more
accurately.
Part IV concludes that, even if courts are uninterested in standing up
for community-centered juries, state legislatures still should do so by
repealing these statutes and joining the majority of states, which function
just fine without buffers. Eliminating buffer statutes would do justice to
the compelling argument that local jury trials facilitate community selfgovernment, and it would also avoid the legal and policy drawbacks of
buffer statutes discussed in Parts I and II.
I.

PREVALENT AND POINTLESS: THE HISTORY AND
PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL COUNTY-LINE BUFFER
STATUTES

Buffer statutes have a widespread use and longstanding history.
Nevertheless, they are not necessary. Related statutes that deal with
multi-jurisdiction crimes and crimes whose locations are unknown can
handle all of the cases that supposedly warrant the use of buffers. More
to the point, they do so while avoiding the drawbacks of buffers.
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Definition of Terms: Vicinage, Venue, and Jurisdiction

This Article deals with three concepts with significant (and
confusing) overlap. Vicinage and venue both establish a place for
purposes of a trial: Vicinage is the place from which the jurors are
drawn, and venue is the place where the trial is held. 14 Usually these are
the same place, and so courts do not try very hard to distinguish between
the two terms. 15 In some cases, the term vicinage also refers to the
location of the crime, so that a "jury of the vicinage" is one drawn from
16
the place where the crime occurred.
Jurisdiction refers not to the location of a trial, but to the power of a
court to hear a case. In some systems, every court has jurisdiction to hear
a case, but venue is proper in only one geographical subdivision. 17 In
other systems, jurisdiction has a geographical basis, and only the court in
8
the proper location has the power to hear a particular case.'
In this Article, the primary considerations will be venue and, by
extension, vicinage, because buffer statutes and the constitutional
provisions that they offend speak in these terms: where trials should be
held and from where the jurors should come. Occasionally, however,
cases or statutes speak in terms of jurisdiction, and in such cases the
Article will use jurisdiction interchangeably with venue, unless the
distinction makes a difference.
B.

CurrentLaws and Their Use

In every state, the default rule for venue and vicinage is that cases are
tried where the crime occurred 19 and the jury is drawn from the place
14. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1598 (8th ed. 2004) ("vicinage"); id. at 1591 ("venue").
15. For a clear and more detailed treatment of these distinctions, see 4 WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.1 (2d ed. 1999).
16. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 14, at 873 (discussing phrase "jury of the
vicinage").
17. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.1(a). Changes in the nature of jurisdiction and
venue have had an impact on the importance attached to vicinage. See Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage,
30 OKLA. L. REv. 3, 41-42 (1977) [hereinafter Kershen, Vicinage I] (discussing changes in federal
system).
18. See4 LAFAVEETAL.,supra note 15, § 16.1(a).
19. See id. § 16.1(c) (discussing "crime-committed" formula as "standard formula for setting
venue" and surveying states' standards); Albert Levitt, Jurisdiction over Crimes, 16 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 316, 324-27 (1925) (discussing history of "Territorial Commission
Theory"). Most states make this default rule a constitutional requirement. See infra notes 128-33
and accompanying text (listing and discussing state constitutional provisions).
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where the case is tried. 20 There are numerous exceptions. Some cases are
moved to another location, with another jury, because of pretrial
publicity, inconvenience, or local bias. 2 1 (While venue may be a matter
of convenience, however, it is also subject in most states to seemingly
strict constitutional requirements that limit trial to the locale of the
crime.) 22 Other cases are situated according to more complicated rules
that apply when there is more than one place where the crime
"occurred," or when the location of a crime is unclear. These exceptions
are discussed in more detail in Part I.D, below. A separate category, and
the subject of this Article, are criminal county-line buffer statutes, which
allow trials to move intrastate to the next county if a crime occurred
close to the border.
Nineteen states, representing a majority of the U.S. population,
currently have county-line buffer statutes on the books.23 (One other
20. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.1(b) ("[I]t is assumed also that the jury will be
drawn from the judicial district in which the trial takes place."). There are exceptions. See, e.g.,
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.225 (West 1998) (providing for selection ofjury in non-forum county).
21. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.3 (discussing change of venue).
22. See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
23. See ALA. CODE § 15-2-7 (1975) ("When an offense is committed on the boundary of two or
more counties or within a quarter of a mile thereof or when it is committed so near the boundary of
two counties as to render it doubtful in which the offense was committed, venue is in either
county."); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-109(B)(5) (2001) ("If an offense is committed on the boundary of
two or more counties or within one mile of such boundary, trial of the offense may be held in any of
the counties concerned."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 782 (West 1985) ("When a public offense is
committed on the boundary of two or more jurisdictional territories, or within 500 yards thereof, the
jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory."); id.
§ 790(a) (same, for murder); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 614 (West 2003) ("An offense
committed on the boundary line of two parishes or within one hundred feet thereof is deemed to
have been committed in either parish."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3 (West 2003) ("When an
offense is committed on the boundary between 2 counties or within 100 rods thereof.., the offense
may be alleged in the complaint or indictment as committed, and may be tried in either."); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 57 (West 2002) ("A crime committed on or within one hundred rods of
the boundary line of two counties may be alleged to have been committed, and may be prosecuted
and punished, in either county; and if committed on or within fifty rods of the boundary line of two
judicial districts, it may be alleged to have been committed, and may be prosecuted and punished, in
either district."); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 762.3(1) (West 2000) ("Any offense committed on the
boundary line of 2 counties, or within I mile of the dividing line between them, may be alleged in
the indictment to have been committed, and may be prosecuted and punished in either county."); id.
§ 762.4 ("Whenever any court of record having criminal jurisdiction, the boundaries of whose
jurisdiction as fixed by statute are not coincident with the boundary lines of a county or counties,
shall take jurisdiction or have pending before it any trial or cause arising out of the commission of
an offense at, on or near to the boundary line of the jurisdiction of said court, the jurisdiction of said
court shall not be questioned, after the swearing of the jury, unless the evidence shall show the
offense to have been committed more than 100 rods outside of the boundary of the jurisdiction of
said court as fixed by statute."); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 24.02(2) ("Offenses committed on or within
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state has a law on its books that its courts have declared
1,500 feet (457.2M) of the boundary line between two counties may be alleged in the complaint or
indictment to have been committed in either of them and may be prosecuted and tried in either
county."); NEV. REV. STAT. 171.035 (2003) ("When an offense is committed on the boundary of
two or more counties, or within 500 yards thereof, the venue is in either county."); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 20.40(4)(c) (McKinney 2003) ("An offense committed within five hundred yards of
the boundary of a particular county, and in an adjoining county of this state, may be prosecuted in
either such county."); id. § 20.50(2) ("Where an offense prosecutable in a local criminal court is
committed in a city other than New York City, or in a town or village, but within one hundred yards
of any other such political subdivision, it may be prosecuted in either such political subdivision.");
N.D.CENT. CODE § 29-03-05 (1991) ("When a public offense is committed on the boundary of two
or more counties, or within five hundred yards thereof, the jurisdiction is in either county."); OR.
REV. STAT. § 131.315(6) (2003) ("If an offense is committed on the boundary of two or more
counties or within one mile thereof, trial of the offense may be held in any of the counties
concerned."); PA. R. CRM.P. 130(A)(5) ("When any offense is alleged to have occurred within 100
yards of the boundary between two or more magisterial districts of a judicial district, the proceeding
may be brought in either or any of the magisterial districts without regard to the boundary lines of
any county."); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-3-5 (2002) ("A criminal offense committed on or within one
hundred (100) rods of the boundary line of two (2) counties may be alleged to have been committed
and may be prosecuted and proceeded against in either county unless otherwise ordered by the
presiding justice, and if a crime is committed on or within fifty (50) rods of the boundary line of two
(2) divisions of the district court, it may be alleged to have been committed and may be proceeded
against and prosecuted in either division unless otherwise ordered by the chief judge pursuant to
§ 12-3-4(c)."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-16-9 (Michie 2004) ("When a public offense is
committed on the boundary of two or more counties, or within five hundred yards thereof, the venue
is in either county."); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 13.04 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 2004) ("An
offense committed on the boundaries of two or more counties, or within four hundred yards thereof,
may be prosecuted and punished in any one of such counties and any offense committed on the
premises of any airport operated jointly by two municipalities and situated in two counties may be
prosecuted and punished in either county."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4603 (2002) ("If an offense is
committed on the boundary of two or more counties or territorial units of the district court, or within
100 rods of such boundary, such offense may be alleged in the information or indictment to have
been committed and may be prosecuted in the superior court in any of such counties or in the
district court in any of such territorial units, if the offense is within the jurisdiction of such court.");
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-249 (Michie 2004) ("An offense committed on the boundary of two
counties, or on the boundary of two cities, or on the boundary of a county and city, or within 300
yards thereof, may be alleged to have been committed, and may be prosecuted and punished, in
either county, in either city, or the county or city .. ");id. § 19.2-250(A) ("Notwithstanding any
other provision of this article and except as provided in subsection B hereof, the jurisdiction of the
corporate authorities of each town or city, in criminal cases involving offenses against the
Commonwealth, shall extend within the Commonwealth one mile beyond the corporate limits of
such town or city; except that such jurisdiction of the corporate authorities of towns situated in
counties having a density of population in excess of 300 inhabitants per square mile, or in counties
adjacent to cities having a population of 170,000 or more, shall extend for 300 yards beyond the
corporate limits of such town or, in the case of the criminal jurisdiction of an adjacent county, for
300 yards within such town."); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.19(3) (West 1998 & Supp. 2004) ("Where
an offense is committed on or within one-fourth of a mile of the boundary of 2 or more counties, the
defendant may be tried in any of such counties.").
According to the 2000 Census, see U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 3, the population of these
nineteen states is 50.2% of the total U.S. population.
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unconstitutional.) 24 The width of the buffer zones 25 established by these
statutes ranges from 100 feet (in Louisiana) to a mile (in Arizona,
Michigan, and Oregon); the median and most common distance is 1500
feet. 26 Befitting the anachronistic nature of the statutes, some define the
buffer width in rods, an archaic measure equal to 51/2 yards.2 7
Notwithstanding these buffer statutes, most of these states have
constitutional provisions requiring crimes to be tried by a jury of the
county, district, "vicinage," or some other limited area. 8

24. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 125 (West 2003) ("When a public offense is committed on
the boundary of two or more counties, or within five hundred (500) yards thereof, the jurisdiction is
in either county."); Smith v. State, 197 P. 712, 713-14 (1921) (striking down statute). There are
several other states that used to have buffer statutes but have repealed them or had them struck
down by courts. See infra note 38 and Map A accompanying note 29.
25. The width can be expressed as either the distance into a county that it reaches or twice that
amount, because there will be a contiguous buffer of equal width on the other side of the border.
This Article uses width in the former sense.
26. For specific provisions, see supra note 23. The following is a rough listing of the states with
distances converted into feet: Alabama, 1320; Arizona, 5280; California, 1500; Louisiana, 100;
Maine, 1650; Massachusetts, 1650; Michigan, 5280; Minnesota, 1500; Nevada, 1500; New York,
1500; North Dakota, 1500; Oregon, 5280; Pennsylvania, 300; Rhode Island, 1650; South Dakota,
1500; Texas, 1200; Vermont, 1650; Virginia, 900; Wisconsin, 1320. See also AM. LAW INST., CODE
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 243 (Official Draft 1930) (recommending 500-yard buffer); infra note
35 (discussing British 500-yard buffer).
27. These states include Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Michigan uses rods
in a secondary statute. See supranote 23.
28. This apparent contradiction is best seen by comparing Map A below of state buffer provisions
with Map B accompanying note 133, which shows state constitutional provisions.
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Map A

2

29

It is difficult to assess how often and when these statutes are actually
used. Judging solely from the appellate case law, it appears that some
29. This Map is not necessarily exhaustive, and is based on the information in note 23, supra and
notes 38-42, infra.
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states use them on occasion, while others, lacking case law, perhaps do
not use them at all. 30 An informal survey conducted for this article was
inconclusive. Most jurisdictions claimed not to use the statutes very
often; other states indicated that they did; and some even admitted that
they did so for reasons other than mere administrative convenience, such
as to obtain a more favorable jury.3 1 Prosecutors in some counties30. For examples of states with buffer statutes that lack related appellate cases, see Barnes v.
State, 429 So. 2d 1114, 1119 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); People v. McClure, No. A100807, 2003 WL
22463952, at *2-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct 31, 2003); State v. True, 330 A.2d 787, 789-91 (Me. 1975);
People v. Wood, No. 235558, 2003 WL 1558222, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2003);
McLaughlin v. Eidens, 740 N.Y.S.2d 147, 149 (App. Div. 2002); State v. McCown, 833 P.2d 1321,
1322 (Or. Ct. App. 1992); Commonwealth v. Buechele, 444 A.2d 1246, 1250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982);
Hurst v. State, No. 11-01-00400-CR, 2002 WL 32345371, at *1 n.l (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2002);
Hamm v. City of Norton, No. 1607-98-3, 1999 WL 1134656, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 1999);
see also infra note 40 (collecting cases deciding constitutionality of buffer statutes).
31. For this Article, Lance Werner made a series of inquiries to county prosecutors' offices
around the country, concentrating on states with buffer statutes and counties with very
demographically-different neighbors. Some officials said that they used the buffer statutes
occasionally. See Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Dennis McGrane, Chief Deputy
District Attorney, Yavapai County, Ariz. (Oct. 6, 2003) (indicating occasional use of statute for
transit and vehicular offenses); Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Brett Stassi,
Investigator, Plaquemines Parish District Attorney, La. (Sept. 19, 2003) (indicating frequent use of
statute); Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Paul Lynn, Deputy Chief, Appellate Division,
Seventh Quadrant District Attorney, Suffolk County, Mass. (Oct. 2, 2003) (indicating use of statute
for vehicular offenses and due to confusing boundaries in Boston area); Telephone Interview by
Lance Werner with Mary Yunker, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Sherburne County, Minn. (Oct.
10, 2003) (indicating frequent use of statute because city of St. Cloud spans three counties);
Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Patrick McCormick, Chief Assistant District Attorney,
Nassau County, N.Y. (Nov. 19, 2003) (indicating awareness and use of statute).
One official admitted that his county had used the statute to obtain a more favorable jury. See
Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Paul McMurdie, Division Chief of Appeals and
Research, Maricopa County, Ariz. (Sept. 18, 2003) (recounting use of statute to avoid rural jury in
multi-jurisdiction molestation case). Another said more generally that when counties worked out
who would take the case, they considered which county's case was "stronger." Telephone Interview
by Lance Werner with Jim Mosely, First Assistant District Attorney, Cleveland County, Okla. (Oct.
24, 2003). Others said that they only used the statutes when the location of the crime was in doubt.
See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Jon Poyner, District Attorney, Colusa County,
Cal. (Nov. 4, 2003); Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Dennis Mahoney, First Assistant
District Attorney, Norfolk County, Mass. (Sept. 30, 2003) (recounting confusing multi-jurisdiction
case); Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Judy Roberts, Intern, Grand Forks State
Attorney's Office, N.D. (Oct. 21, 2003); see also infra Part I.E. (arguing that "doubt" statutes
achieve most benefits of buffer statutes with few of their costs).
Most officials said that they rarely use the statute. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Lance
Werner with Patrick Lamb, Deputy District Attorney, Jefferson County, Ala. (Sept. 18, 2003);
Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with James Peart, Magistrate Judge, Adams County, Idaho
(Sept. 19, 2003); Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with David Allison, District Attorney,
Humboldt County, Nev. (Oct. 21, 2003); Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Mary
Killinger, Deputy District Attorney, Montgomery County, Pa. (Nov. 20, 2003); Telephone Interview

Washington Law Review

Vol. 80:271, 2005

including, perhaps not coincidentally, the one in which Clarence Terrell
was prosecuted-were evasive.3 2 Overall, it seems that while district
attorneys are not troubled by these statutes, they would not miss the
statutes terribly if they were repealed or reformed.
Buffer statutes serve both benign and malign purposes. The benign
purposes center on issues of convenience and evidentiary simplicity. As
discussed in detail in Part I.E, buffer statutes avoid the problems of proof
and administrative inconvenience that result from crimes that occur near
borders, but buffer statutes are a needlessly blunt instrument for
avoiding such complications. Thus there are no countervailing benefits
to justify the malign purposes these statutes can serve, such as forum
shopping and power grabs by prosecutors, or the damage they do to the
principle of vicinage. Finally, the fact that these statutes are not used
very often-and that the states that lack such laws manage quite wellunderscores that buffer laws, and their costs, are unnecessary.
C.

A BriefHistory of Buffer Statutes

Regardless of how buffer statutes are used today, they have been used
in the past, and they have been passed and repassed by dozens of
legislatures dozens of times. The impetus for the creation of buffer
statutes is unclear. The theoretical rationale for the statutes is fairly well
documented: to protect prosecutions from derailing over the technicality
of the precise location of a near-border crime.33 There is no obvious
explanation, however, for why no states had such statutes until the mid1830s, after which nearly half of the states adopted a buffer statute
within a generation.34 The inspiration might have come from an 1819
by Lance Werner with Robert Donohoo, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Milwaukee County, Wis.
(Nov. 20, 2003).
32. See Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with unnamed official, Oakland County
Prosecutor's Office, Mich. (Oct. 17, 2003) (indicating use of buffer statute but stating that different
police agencies generally resolve jurisdictional disputes). Werner's notes indicate that other
counties refused to discuss the issue at all.
33. See infra Part I.E. The laws also might have reflected a general sentiment against slavishly
trying crimes in the stricken community. See, e.g., 1JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 278 (London, MacMillan 1883) (noting English buffer statute and
arguing for basing venue solely on convenience).
34. There were fifteen states with buffer statutes by 1860, out of the thirty-three states extant. See
ALA. CODE § 3365 (1852) (quarter-mile buffer); A DIGEST OF THE STATUTES OF ARKANSAS ch. 52,
§ 107, at 403--04 (E.H. English ed., Little Rock, Reardon & Garritt 1848) (half-mile buffer); DIGEST
OF THE LAWS OF CALIFORNIA art. 1433, at 277 (William H.R. Wood ed., San Francisco, S.D.
Valentine & Son 1857) (500-yard buffer); IOWA REV. STAT. ch. IV, § 40 (1843) (500-yard buffer);
ACTS PASSED BY THE SECOND LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, No. 121, § 12, at 152
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British statute that established a 500-yard buffer. 35 If, however, there
were numerous cases in the United States of prosecutions falling apart
because of the lack of these statutes, those cases occasioned little
comment. Indeed, there is no evidence to support any theory of the
origin of these statutes in most states other than simple imitation.
If buffer statutes reflected the problems of sketchy borders in an age
of rapid westward expansion, one would expect that as time passed the
adoption of these statutes would have become less common as the
marking of borders improved, but this is inconsistent with the actual
chronological pattern of statutory adoption. Similarly, one might expect
that "old" states with confusing "metes and bounds" county-line
definitions would have needed buffer statutes more than "new" states
using the Public Land Survey System (PLSS), but there is no such
correlation in the statutory history here either.3 6
(New Orleans, La Sere 1855) (100-yard buffer); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 166, § 4 (1847) (100-rod
buffer); MASS. REV. STAT. ch. 133, § 7 (1836) (100-rod buffer); MICH. REV. STAT. pt. 4, tit. 1, ch.
11, § 7 (1838) (100-rod buffer); Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 138, art. IV, § 7 (1845) (500-yard buffer); N.Y.
REV. STAT. pt. IV, ch. II, tit. IV, § 45 (1836) (500-yard buffer); Act of Mar. 31, 1860, § 48,
reprinted in 1860 Pa. Laws 375 (500-yard buffer); TENN. CODE § 4976 (1858) (quarter-mile buffer);
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 191 (1857) (400-yard buffer); ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
VIRGINIA, ch. XI, § 7, at 122 (Richmond, Samuel Shepherd 1848) (100-yard buffer); WIS. REV.
STAT. ch. 141, § 7 (1849) (100-rod buffer). Some territories had buffers at that time as well. See,
e.g., S.W. KEARNY, LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO 90-91 (Santa Fe 1846) (establishing
500-yard buffer in Territory of New Mexico); WASH. TERR. STAT. § 130 (1855) (establishing 100rod buffer in Territory of Washington).
Because of the difficulty of researching nineteenth-century statutes, this accounting is less
definitive than it might otherwise be. In Arkansas, for instance, the 1848 statute cited above was
tested in an 1861 case in which the statute was quoted and applied as if it had no buffer. See State v.
Rhoda, 23 Ark. 156, 157 (1861).
35. An Act to Facilitate the Trials of Felonies Committed on Stage Coaches and Stage Wagons,
or Other Such Carriages; and of Felonies Committed on the Boundaries of Counties, 59 Geo. 3,
c. 96, § 2 (1819) (Eng.). Then again, while many of the first group of states to adopt buffer statutes
used 500 yards as the width of their buffers, most did not. Another potential inspiration appears to
have been a 1795 Massachusetts statute that gave jurisdiction to both Suffolk and Middlesex
Counties over offenses that occurred on either bank of the Charles River that divided them, though
that statute's effect on other states, if any, was long delayed and minor. See Act of Feb. 10, 1795,
§ 1, reprinted in 2 THE LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM NOVEMBER 28,

1780 TO FEBRUARY 28, 1807, at 654 (Boston, Thomas & Andrews 1807) [hereinafter
MASSACHUSETTS LAWS]; Commonwealth v. Gillon, 84 Mass. 502, 503 (1861) (describing 1835
recommendation of buffer statute as "extension" of Suffolk-Middlesex statute).
36. By 1860, the United States comprised thirty-five states. The original thirteen states plus
Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia are the "metes and
bounds" states, in which property and county lines are generally defined descriptively. See, e.g., Act
of June 21, 1799, § 1, reprintedin 2 MASSACHUSETTS LAWS, supra note 35, at 838-39 (describing
county line as proceeding "northwesterly by the westerly line of said Pittston to the mouth of
Purgatory-Stream (so called) which empties itself into Cobbesecontee-Stream (so called)")
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After the initial burst of statutory adoptions between 1836 and 1860,
the pattern shifted. Since 1860, some states have added buffer statutes,37
but others have lost theirs38 or changed the size of their buffers. 39 There
(emphasis in original); Act of Dec. 24, 1777, ch. XLII, reprinted in 1 THE FIRST LAWS OF THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 350 (John D. Cushing ed., 1984) (directing establishment of one

portion of a county border at "a Line from Drowning Creek Bank, beginning where Overstreet's
Bridge formerly was") (italics in original); Act of Mar. 12, 1785, reprintedin 2 THE FIRST LAWS OF
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 358 (John D. Cushing ed., 1981) (defining Clarendon County

border as "beginning on the Wateree at Person's Island, thence in a straight line to Black River at
Potter's Plantation, thence by the Widow Grimes' plantation in a straight line to Lynch's Creek,
[etc.]"). Of the eighteen of these states that were in existence by 1860, only seven (Massachusetts,
New York, Maine, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) had buffer statutes by then. See
supra note 34 (listing statutes).
The other fifteen states extant in 1860 had more precisely defined property and county lines
under the Public Land Survey System (PLSS). Of these states, eight had buffer statutes: Alabama,
Arkansas, California, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, and Wisconsin. See supra note 34
(listing statutes). It appears that, despite the more systematic definition of boundaries, even these
states faced some uncertainty as to their locations. See, e.g., People v. Richards, 226 N.W. 651, 653
(Mich. 1929) (explaining buffer statute as "quite necessary and important in early days, when
section lines had not been definitely established"). For a good explanation of the PLSS, see U.S.
Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Mgmt. & Fed. Geographic Data Comm., Cadastral Subcomm.,
Cadastral
Information
for GIS
Specialists,
Part One,
at http://www.fairviewindustries.com/gismodule/PartOneHistory.html (last modified May 2002).
37. Because of the difficulty in researching antebellum statutes, it is possible that some of these
states had buffer laws before 1860. Fourteen states appear to have passed buffer statutes after 1860
(all but two before 1900): Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Vermont. See ARIZ. TERR. COMP.
LAWS ch. 11, § 69 (1877) (500-yard buffer); LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF IDAHO ch. 2, § 85, at 245
(Lewiston, Idaho, Glascock 1864) (500-yard buffer); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5 (1874) (100-rod
buffer); MINN. GEN. STAT. ch. 108, § 20 (1866) (100-rod buffer); MONT. PENAL CODE § 1565
(1895) (500-yard buffer); Act of Nov. 26, 1861, § 86, reprinted in LAWS OF THE TERRITORY OF
NEVADA 444 (William Martin Gillespie ed., San Francisco, Valentine & Co. 1862) (500-yard
buffer); DAK. TERR. REV. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 76 (1877) (North Dakota) (500-yard buffer); OHIO
CODE ANN. § 13426-2 (Throckmorton 1930) (100-rod buffer); OKLA. STAT. § 5375 (1890) (500yard buffer); OR. CODE CRIM. PROC. ch. III, § 17, at 444 (1865) (one-mile buffer); Act of Apr. 23,
1915, § 34, reprinted in ACTS AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE
OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS ch. 1261, at 229 (1915) (50- and 100-rod
buffers); DAK. TERR. REV. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 76 (1877) (South Dakota) (500-yard buffer); ACTS
AND RESOLVES PASSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF VERMONT, No. 5,

§8

(Montpelier, J. & J.M. Poland's Steam Printing Works 1870) (100-rod buffer).
Two other states-New Mexico and Washington-had buffer statutes as territories before 1860,
but they did not attain statehood until after 1860. See KEARNY, supra note 34, at 90-91 (establishing
500-yard buffer in Territory of New Mexico); WASH. TERR. STAT. § 130 (1855) (establishing 100rod buffer in Territory of Washington). West Virginia inherited Virginia's buffer upon achieving
statehood in 1863, and kept the statute. See W. VA. CODE ch. 152, § 12 (1870) (100-yard buffer).
38. Courts in eight states have struck down buffer statutes as unconstitutional. See Dougan v.
State, 30 Ark. 41, 43 (1875) (striking down half-mile buffer statute); Buckrice v. People, 110 I11.29,
34-35 (1884) (striking down 100-rod buffer statute); State v. Montgomery, 38 So. 949, 949 (La.
1905) (striking down 100-yard buffer statute); In re McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370, 379 (1885)
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was a burst of litigation challenging buffer statutes on the basis of state
constitutional requirements for local trials or local juries (some
successful and some not) in the 1860s, 70s, and 80s; litigation slowed to
a trickle after that.40 Some states-typically those whose constitutions
(striking down 500-yard buffer statute); State v. Chalikes, 170 N.E. 653, 654 (Ohio 1930) (striking
down 100-rod buffer statute); Smith v. State, 197 P. 712, 713-14 (Okla. 1921) (striking down 500yard buffer statute); Armstrong v. State, 41 Tenn. 338, 343-44 (1860) (striking down quarter-milebuffer statute); State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 795 (1883) (striking down 100-yard buffer statute).
Five states have repealed their buffer statutes. See State v. Koseris, 162 P.2d 172, 173 & n.1
(Idaho 1945) (discussing amendment of 500-yard buffer statute in 1945); State v. Donnelly, 242
N.W.2d 295, 298 (Iowa 1976) (mentioning 1973 repeal of 500-yard buffer statute); MONT. REV.
CODE § 95-403 (1969) (half-mile buffer); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-3-103 history (describing 1991
repeal of buffer provision from former § 95-403); 1963 N.M. Laws ch. 303, § 30-1 (repealing 500yard buffer provision described in note 34, supra); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.25.030 (West
1980) (100-rod buffer), superseded by WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5.1 (no buffer).
39. Some buffers have gotten bigger. Compare ARIz. TERR. COMP. LAWS ch. 11, § 69 (1877)
(500 yards), and MICH. REV. STAT. pt. 4, tit. 1, ch. 11, § 7 (1838) (100 rods), and VA. CODE
ch. 199, § 13 (1849) (100 yards), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-109(B)(5) (2001) (one mile), and
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 762.3(1) (West 2000) (one mile), and VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-249
(Michie 2004) (300 yards).
Others have gotten smaller. CompareAct of Mar. 31, 1860, § 48, reprinted in 1860 Pa. Laws 375
(500 yards), and MINN. STAT. § 627.07 (1947) (100 rods), and WiS. REV. STAT. ch. 141, § 7 (1849)
(100 rods), with PA. R. CRiM. P. 130(A)(5) (100 yards), and MINN. R. CRIM. P. 24.02(2) (West
1995) (1500 feet), and WiS. STAT. ANN. § 971.19(3) (West 1998 & Supp. 2003) (quarter mile).
Louisiana's buffer has changed the most. The state began with a 100-yard buffer, see ACTS
PASSED BY THE SECOND LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, No. 121, § 12, at 152 (New
Orleans, La Sere 1855), which was struck down in Montgomery, 38 So. at 949. Then, the 1921
constitution specifically superseded Montgomery, see LA. CONST. of 1921, art. I, § 9 (authorizing
legislature to enact 100-foot buffer). Louisiana currently has a 100-foot buffer. See LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 614 (West 2003).
40. Cases striking down buffer statutes on state constitutional grounds include, in chronological
order: Armstrong, 41 Tenn. at 343-44 (1860); Dougan, 30 Ark. at 43 (1875); Lowe, 21 W. Va. at
795 (1883); Buckrice, 110 Ill. at 34-35 (1884); McDonald, 19 Mo. App. at 379 (1885);
Montgomery, 38 So. at 949 (1905) (La.); Smith, 197 P. at 713-14 (1921) (Okla.); Chalikes, 170 N.E.
at 654 (1930) (Ohio). In some states, the court allowed the buffer statute to be applied only when
there was doubt as to where the crime occurred or where the county line was. See, e.g., Cox v. State,
60 S.W. 27, 27 (Ark. 1900) (limiting statute to cases where location of county line is in doubt);
Smith, 197 P. at 713 (striking down statute where location of crime is not in doubt); see also infra
note 42 (discussing "doubt" standards).
Cases affirming buffer statutes in the face of direct state constitutional challenges include, in
chronological order: Hill v. State, 43 Ala. 335, 338 (1869) (basing decision on fact that prosecution
was not by indictment, but bolstered later by Jackson v. State, 8 So. 862, 862 (Ala. 1891), in which
defendant was indicted); State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447, available at 1869 WL 2333, at *3-5
(1869), approved by State v. Sanderson, 469 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State ex rel.
Brown v. Stewart, 19 N.W. 429, 433-34 (Wis. 1884); State v. Pugsley, 38 N.W. 498, 501 (Iowa
1888); Commonwealth v. Collins, 110 A. 738, 739-40 (Pa. 1920); State v. Lehman, 279 P. 283,
284-85 (Or. 1929); Kaseris v. Justice Court, 144 P.2d 469, 470-71 (Idaho 1943); State v.
Swainston, 676 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); see also Fisher v. County of Roanoke,
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required that crimes be tried by juries in the specific county where the
crime was committed-struck down their buffer statutes in these cases.4 1
Other states replaced their buffer statutes with narrower "doubt" statutes
that expand venue only in those cases in which the location of the crime
or of the county line is unclear.42 When states have dropped their buffer
statutes, there does not appear to have been any related public outcry
about criminals going free or the wheels of justice getting stuck.

522 S.E.2d 392, 393 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding statute against constitutional challenge),
vacated by 542 S.E.2d 22 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
Note, then, that there were nine cases between 1860 and 1888 (five negative, four positive); five
more between 1905 and 1930 (three negative, two positive); and only two since then (both positive).
Given how closely balanced the outcomes of these cases have been, it is difficult to deduce any
consensus. See 16 C.J. CriminalLaw § 295, at 196-97 (1918) (characterizing case law at time as, on
balance, allowing buffer statutes); HASCAL R. BRILL, 1 CYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINAL LAW § 290, at
516 (1922) (characterizing balance as narrowly favoring constitutionality of buffers); 8 RULING
CASE LAW § 59, at 99 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1915) (characterizing buffer
statutes as "generally, although not always, be[ing] held unconstitutional").
41. The state constitutions provided specific "county" language in Dougan, 30 Ark. at 42;
Montgomery, 38 So. at 949 ("parish"); McDonald, 19 Mo. App. at 379; Chalikes, 170 N.E. at 653;
Smith, 197 P. at 713; and Lowe, 21 W. Va. at 786. There was "county or district" language in
Buckrice, 110 Ill. at 33, and Armstrong, 41 Tenn. at 342. Significantly, Arizona and Oregon have
such restrictive language, but nevertheless upheld their buffer statutes. See Swainston, 676 P.2d at
1154-55; Lehman, 279 P. at 284-85.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 60-61 (further discussing doubt statutes). Six states that
used to have buffer statutes, see supra note 38, now have only doubt statutes. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-88-108(a) (Michie 1987) ("If it is uncertain where the boundary is, the indictment may be
found, and a trial had, in either county."); IDAHO CODE § 19-305 (Michie 2004) ("When a public
offense is committed on the boundary of two (2) or more counties, or within five hundred (500)
yards thereof, if the place where the crime is committed cannot be ascertained with reasonable
certainty by the law enforcing'officers of either county ... then in any such event the venue is in
either county."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-3-114 (2003) ("[Ihf the county in which the offense was
committed cannot be readily determined, the offender may be charged in any county in which it
appears that an element of the offense occurred."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.12(G) (Anderson
2003) ("When it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense or any element of an offense
was committed in any of two or more jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in which
jurisdiction the offense or element was committed, the offender may be tried in any such
jurisdiction."); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20 ("[W]here uncertainty exists as to the county in which the
crime was committed, the accused may be tried in any county in which the evidence indicates the
crime might have been committed."); WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 5.1(b) ("When there is
reasonable doubt whether an offense has been committed in one of two or more counties, the action
may be commenced in any such county.").
Nine other states that never had buffer statutes currently have doubt statutes. See COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1-202 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-352c (West 1985); FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 16; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 910.03 (West 2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-32-2-1 (West 1998 &
Supp. 2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2604 (1995); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-201 (Michie
2001); N.J. R. 3:14-1; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-202 (2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-7-102 (Michie
2003).
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Most states (thirty-one) have had buffer statutes at some point in their
history, and most of those states (nineteen) still have their statutes
today.43 There is still no geographic rhyme or reason to the state laws.
"Metes and bounds" states are still no more likely to have buffer statutes
than PLSS states. 44 Wide-open western states, with their sparse
populations45 and expansive spaces, also have not developed a
consensus.

Today, most of the states that retain their buffer statutes either have
47
no constitutional vicinage requirements, 46 have only vague ones, or
48 Plenty, however,
else have never had the constitutional issue litigated.
49
have had their buffer statutes specifically approved by their courts, and
a few have done so despite their seemingly restrictive constitutional
vicinage provisions.5 °
D.

OtherJurisdictionand Venue Statutes "at the Margins"

Buffer statutes are not the only laws that cross county lines to deal
with criminal venue and vicinage. Indeed, where there are no
constitutional vicinage restrictions, states have generally been free to set
whichever venue rules they choose.5 '
43. In addition to the nineteen states that have buffer statutes now, see supra note 23, there are
twelve other states that used to have them, see supra note 38; supra Map A accompanying note 29.
44. Currently, eight of the twenty metes and bounds states have buffer statutes, versus eleven of
the thirty PLSS states. See supra Map A accompanying note 29 (depicting state provisions); supra
note 36 (discussing metes and bounds and PLSS states).
45. See supra Map A accompanying note 29.
46. These states are Michigan, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, and Texas.
Compare supra Map A, accompanying note 29 (depicting statutory buffer provisions), with infra
Map B accompanying note 133 (depicting state constitutional provisions).
47. These states are Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Virginia. Compare supra
Map A accompanying note 28 (depicting statutory buffer provisions), with infra Map B
accompanying note 133 (depicting state constitutional provisions).
48. These states are California and South Dakota.
49. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See supra note 40 (collecting case law).
50. Arizona and Oregon have constitutional provisions that limit the venue or vicinage to the
"county." Alabama, Minnesota, and Wisconsin refer to the "county or district." See infra note 131
(collecting constitutional provisions).
51. See People v. Goldswer, 350 N.E.2d 604, 607 (N.Y. 1976); Annotation, Constitutionalityof
Statute for Prosecution of Offense in County Other than That in Which It Was Committed, 76
A.L.R. 1034, 1035 (1932) [hereinafter Constitutionalityof Statute]; cf 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note
15, § 16.1(e) ("Where a state has either a constitutional venue guarantee of a right to trial in the
county in which the offense was committed or a constitutional guarantee of a jury of the vicinage,
special venue legislation can pose constitutional difficulties ....) (footnotes omitted).
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The general principle that crimes should be tried where they were
committed 52 is vulnerable to several factual complications, of which
buffer statutes are but one example. One complication is that in some
crimes, different elements occur in different jurisdictions, such as when
a shooter's victim staggers over to the other side of the border to die, or
a telemarketing scammer calls across state lines. In English common
law, such crimes originally went unpunished because it was necessary to
establish that all elements of the charge had been committed in one
jurisdiction.53 This formality began to soften in England in 1548, 54 and it
never took root in the in the United States. From early on, American law
allowed prosecution for multi-jurisdictional crimes and provided default
rules to determine which jurisdiction would host the prosecution." A
particular state might need to get those rules just right to fully vindicate
the vicinage principle. However, as long as the forum jurisdiction has at
least part of the crime committed in it,56 and as long as the act is a crime
in both places, 57 the vicinage principle has a foothold.
A second tricky situation, and one that is more closely related to
buffers, is presented when a crime is committed precisely on a border.
The defendant may argue that the border is in neither county and,
therefore, that neither county has jurisdiction. To deal with this situation,
states commonly allow for crimes committed on a borderline to be
52. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The origins and rationale for this requirement are
touched upon further in Part ILA, infra.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78.
54. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
55. See Norman Abrams, Conspiracy and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The
Crime Committed Formula, 9 UCLA L. REv. 751, 789-90 (1962) (describing early American case
law); see also 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supranote 15, § 16.1 (d) (describing history and practice of "multivenue offenses").
56. States may go even further and allow venue to be set where the victim is found, even if that is
not an element of the offense. The Minnesota case of State v. Krejci, 458 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1990),
is such an example-the court upheld a statute that allowed venue where a child abuse victim is
found, analogizing to murder cases where venue could be where the victim died. See id. at 410 &
n.3. As the dissent noted, however, the victim being found was not an element of the crime of child
abuse. Id. at 414 (Kelley, J., dissenting).
57. Of course, if the act in question was a crime in only one of the counties-say, selling alcohol
near the border of a dry county and a wet county-then a conviction requires a showing that the act
occurred in the county where the act was illegal. This is true even when buffer statutes and their ilk
are used. See, e.g., McKay v. State, 20 So. 455, 455-56 (Ala. 1896) (refusing to apply buffer statute
to activities in wet county near dry county); Chadwick v. State, 296 S.W.2d 857, 860-61 (Tenn.
1956) (refusing to try violation of alcohol laws in wet county under travel jurisdiction statute);
Lancaster v. State, 147 S.W.2d 476, 476 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941) (refusing to apply buffer statute to
activities that occurred in wet county, but near dry county where they would have been illegal).
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prosecuted in either county.58 As with buffers, and unlike the multijurisdictional cases discussed above, this rule takes a crime committed in
only one place and allows for a trial in two places. These on-the-border
crimes differ from buffer-zone crimes, though, because in the former it
is truly no fairer to say that the crime was committed in one place as
opposed to another. Unless the state defines the borderline as part of
only one of the two counties, a trial in either county cannot be said to be
in the "wrong" place.
Somewhat less defensible are broader "river-border" statutes. If a
crime is committed on a river that forms a border between two counties,
and thus is part of neither, a borderline statute allows trial on either
shore, in either county. Some river-border statutes go further, however,
and allow trial to be held in any county for which the river is a border,
regardless of how far down- or upstream the forum county is, even when
there is no possibility that the crime occurred off the shores of the forum
county.59
Perhaps the closest cousin to buffer statutes-and the one that best
exposes their pointlessness-is the border-confusion or "doubt" statute.
Most states provide that if it is unclear on which side of a county line 6a
county. 0
crime was committed, the crime can be prosecuted in either
58. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 17-2-2(b) (2003) ("If a crime is committed on, or immediately
adjacent to, the boundary line between two counties, the crime shall be considered as having been
committed in either county."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1305 (1995) ("When an offense shall be
committed on a county line, the trial may be in either county divided by such line .... "); TENN. R.
CRIM. P. 18(c) ("Offenses committed on the boundary of two (2) or more counties may be
prosecuted in either county.").
59. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-6(e) (2002) ("If an offense is committed on any of the
navigable waters bordering on this State, the offender may be tried in any county adjacent to such
navigable water."); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 20.40(4)(h) (McKinney 2003) ("An offense
committed on board a vessel navigating or lying in any river, canal or lake flowing through or
situated within this state, may be prosecuted in any county bordering upon such body of water, or in
which it is located, or through which it passes .... ); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-202(g)(ii) (2004)
("When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering on or within this state, the offender
may be tried in any county adjacent to such body of water."). Such statutes may be justifiable if the
criminal boarded a boat in one county, journeyed downstream several counties, and then committed
a crime on the river. If the river is not part of any one county, the point of embarkation is as
legitimate a place to try the crime as any other. Broad river-border statutes may also be justifiable
when an offense occurred on a moving vessel; while it may be certain that the crime occurred on the
boat, it may be far from certain which counties were closest by when the crime occurred. Cf N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 20.40(4)(f) (McKinney 2003) (providing similar rule for crimes on mass
transit); 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.1(e) & nn.171-72 (same). However, if there is no
such possibility-if the forum county was not an embarkation point or a conceivable "nearest
shore" point-then these statutes go further than is necessary.
60. See supranote 42 and accompanying text (discussing and listing "doubt" statutes). Of course,
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The need for such statutes is obvious, not just where the location of the
border is unclear, but also in cases where the location of the crime is
hard to show. If actions are clearly criminal on either side of a line, there
is no reason to allow them to be committed with impunity just because
the borders are poorly marked or the prosecution cannot prove beyond a
reasonable doubt where the crime was committed. 6' As with borderline
statutes, doubt statutes allow a trial to occur when, in the absence of
such a statute, there might not be one.
Borderline and doubt statutes substitute the requirement that
prosecutors prove the crime occurred in the forum county with the
requirement that they prove it occurred on or near the border with no
way to tell exactly where. If a defendant believes that the crime was not
committed on the line, and that it is possible to determine precisely
where it occurred, then he may still stipulate or prove that-and commit
himself to being tried in at least one place. What he cannot do is avoid
prosecution altogether.
Perhaps buffer statutes evolved from a combination of borderline and
doubt statutes, and were similarly aimed at aiding prosecutions. When
the exact location of criminal activity is unknown (was the defendant's
punch thrown ten feet from that tree or fifteen?), or when an area is
poorly surveyed and marked, it greatly simplifies matters to create a
fictional presumption that a crime committed very near a border was
actually committed right on it. Rather than require prosecutors to prove a
negative and establish that the true location of a crime cannot be
determined, buffer statutes allow them to substitute a simpler showing
that eliminates doubt and increases efficiency. The problem, of course, is
that buffer statutes go further and allow prosecution in the next county
even when there is no doubt at all that the crime did not occur there.
Buffer statutes do avoid the situation in which a defendant argues that
there is no uncertainty and the prosecutor, who must prove that there
was uncertainty, is forced to prove a negative. However, courts are
capable of sorting out such situations. If one side can prove that the

this result also obtains in any state with a buffer statute, see supra note 23 (listing statutory
provisions), or an "on-the-line" statute, see supra note 58 (listing statutory provisions).
61. See generally Annotation, Necessity of Proving Venue or TerritorialJurisdictionof Criminal
Offense Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 67 A.L.R.3d 988 (1975) (discussing methods and burdens of
proof for venue). Not every jurisdiction requires that venue be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
but many do, and "it is recognized generally, at least by implication, that the venue of a criminal
offense must be proved by the prosecution to some degree of satisfaction, and that this requirement
is a constitutional right of the accused." Id. § 2[a], at 991.

290
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crime occurred in one jurisdiction and the other one cannot disprove
that, then there should be no problem trying the case in that jurisdiction.
The most important difference between buffer statutes and these other
statutes is that multi-jurisdiction statutes, borderline statutes, and
uncertainty statutes simplify rather than complicate-they take crimes
that occurred nowhere and make them triable somewhere, or crimes that
occurred in multiple places and make them triable in one place. In this
way, they provide certainty and administrative efficiency while
preventing defendants from reaping any advantage from the
technicalities of the geography of their crime. Buffer statutes, by
contrast, can take a crime that undoubtedly occurred in one jurisdiction
and make it triable in multiple places, "solving" a problem that never
existed.
E.

Justificationsfor, and Problems with, Buffer Statutes

Even if most states do well enough without them, buffer statutes have
some benefits. Roughly speaking, these advantages can be classified
either as improving administrative efficiency or as making it easier for
prosecutors to win and preserve convictions. The main justification that
courts have advanced in approving buffer statutes is the latter:
The evil intended to be remedied... was that where crimes
were committed on or near a county line, it might turn out in the
proof, after a fair and expensive trial had fully established the
guilt of a defendant, that the indictment was in the wrong
county, and the prosecution would be defeated on the ground
alone that the prosecution was in the wrong county. A few yards
or feet would save the greatest offenders from punishment .... 62
In other words, buffer statutes free prosecutors from the risk of getting a
technical detail wrong that would result in an otherwise guilty person
going free.
Defeating a prosecution on grounds that the indictment misstated the
location of the crime by a few feet seems less justifiable than, say,
allowing a defendant to go free because of mistaken identity (who is thus
actually innocent), or because of an illegal search (who is thus convicted
62. Armstrong v. State, 41 Tenn. 338, 341 (1860); accord Act of Mar. 31, 1860, § 48, reprinted
in 1860 Pa. Laws 375; State v. Harris, 31 So. 782, 784 (La. 1902); State v. True, 330 A.2d 787, 790
(Me. 1975); Commonwealth v. Gillon, 84 Mass. 502, 503 (1861); People v. Richards, 226 N.W.
651, 653 (Mich. 1929); State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869), availableat 1869 WL 2333, at *2;
State v. Lehman, 279 P. 283, 284 (Or. 1929); State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 787 (1883).
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only due to official misconduct). In the case of the geographically
flawed indictment, it might appear that the flaw presents no such issue of
actual innocence or official misconduct, merely a small error of
measurement. Then again, this begs the question. One reason why
crimes are tried where they are committed is that local juries are
supposed to be better at getting at the truth, due to their greater interest
in and knowledge of their environs.63 Clarence Terrell might have been
able to argue more effectively to a local jury that his conduct was
reasonable-to argue, in effect, that he was actually innocent. 64 As for
the parallel of remedying misconduct, buffer statutes are analogous here
too, because they encourage prosecutorial misconduct that, while not
punished as vigorously as Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment
violations, is still nothing worth protecting. Specifically, buffer statutes
allow a prosecutor to pursue a case that everyone knows occurred in
another county, perhaps because conviction is easier than it would be in
the home county-in other words, they allow forum shopping, a practice
that offends basic notions of fairness.65
In most cases, the legitimate goals of the buffer statuteadministrative efficiency and avoiding technical difficulties in
prosecuting crimes near borders-would be served just as well by a
statute that allows prosecution in either county only when there is real
doubt as to where the crime occurred vis-A-vis the county line. Even if
the prosecution proceeds under a near-certain assumption that the crime
was in County A, if it later turns out that it really happened in County B,
this could meet a sensible standard for confusion: a good faith,
reasonable belief that the crime was committed in the forum county.66
More importantly, "doubt" statutes avoid some of the drawbacks of
buffer statutes. It is one thing for prosecutors to forum shop, overstep
their authority, and trample on vicinage and community self-government
on purpose; it is less of a problem if these are merely incident to a
63. See infra text accompanying notes 150-61.
64. See supra Introduction.
65. See, e.g., Grogan v. State, 44 Ala. 9, 13-14 (1870) (refusing to allow transfer of case being
tried under buffer statute after it had been submitted to jury); In re McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370,
377-78 (1885) (striking down buffer statute in part due to fear of prosecutorial abuse). But see
generally Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a
Venue, 78 NEB. L. REv. 79 (1999) (defending forum shopping from its widespread and mainstream
critics). Notably, Professor Algero's defense of forum shopping-which is well taken-nowhere
mentions forum shopping by prosecutors in criminal cases.
66. Cf People v. Cullen, 405 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (N.Y. 1980) (requiring prosecutor to make
"good faith" effort to pinpoint location of crime before receiving benefit of doubt statute).
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reasonable misunderstanding. Indeed, in cases where the location of a
crime is unclear, the community interest in self-government is
correspondingly diminished. If there remains some possibility of forum
shopping, at least doubt statutes limit it to cases where there is at least
enough confusion to pass a reasonableness test.
Rationales of administrative convenience nevertheless merit
discussion. One such argument is that without a buffer statute,
authorities would need to use resources to determine on which side of
the county line a crime occurred. With a buffer statute, these resources
can be saved or directed elsewhere. It is a rare crime, however, in which
it takes much effort to pinpoint the county in which it occurred. This
administrative justification really only applies to cases in which the
location of the crime vis-A-vis the county line is in serious doubt. Such a
situation is adequately covered by doubt statutes.
Another efficiency rationale is that border crimes often involve
authorities from the other side of the line. The Terrell case, in which
police pursuing a suspect across a county line got into a scuffle on the
other side, is one example.67 Another example is a case involving
criminal activity that, while occurring on one side of the line, has effects
that spill over to the other side and draw the concern of law enforcement
officials there. Buckrice v. People,68 discussed below, is a classic
example of this phenomenon. In both of these cases, one county's
authorities became involved in a case even though the crime technically
occurred in another county. It is more efficient to allow such officers to
continue their involvement rather than transfer the case to another
authority.
All of that said, buffer statutes do not advance these efficiency goals
very much. Most of the cases in which authorities in one county are
involved in a crime just across the border would seem to fall under the
exception to the usual rules for multi-jurisdictional crimes with some
counts or some elements committed in different places.69
Cases involving cross-border effects are a more complicated matter

67. See supra Introduction.
68. 110 111.29 (1884).

69. See supra Part I.D. Some cases do not fall under this exception-Terrell, for instance, did not.
However, by the same token, there was no reason in Terrell's case why the matter could not have
been referred to Detroit or Wayne County authorities. See supra Introduction. If authorities can
cooperate with their neighbors well enough to avoid conflicts in buffer cases, then they can
cooperate well enough to divvy up the cases under no-buffer regimes as well. See infra text
accompanying notes 176-77.
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because they are less likely to be covered as multi-jurisdictional crimes.
Buckrice is a paradigmatic example. In that Illinois case, a rollicking
roadhouse sat seventy rods on the Cook County side of the Cook-Kane
county line, and it featured "a number of pleasures forbidden by state
law, city ordinance, and biblical injunction., 70 Cook County authorities
were more concerned with goings on in Chicago than in the boondocks,
but Kane County authorities, lacking a similarly distant center of gravity,
were affected much more directly. 7' Having a hundred-rod buffer statute
allowed the Kane County authorities to take matters into their own
hands, rather than having to get the attention of their Cook County
cohorts. If not for the Illinois constitutional provision requiring trial by a
jury of the county of the crime, which rendered the buffer statute
unconstitutional,72 Kane County might have succeeded in maintaining
jurisdiction over the troublesome roadhouse and shutting it down. If the
statute had been constitutional, it would have provided a way for Kane
County to vindicate its interests much more directly and efficiently, and
it likely would have been more efficient for Cook County officials (who
would have been left alone) as well.
If the Illinois Supreme Court had allowed the statute in Buckrice to
stand, however, Buckrice could simply have rebuilt his roadhouse 496
feet further east into Cook County to evade Kane County's reach. If
buffer statutes offer a more efficient path to pursue crimes with crossborder effects, the gains are necessarily limited. County authority has to
end at some line, and there will always be rollicking roadhouses just on
the other side.
There are, moreover, corresponding efficiency losses in such buffer
cases. The county in which a crime occurs will not always be as
lackadaisical about prosecuting as Cook County was in Buckrice. All
other things being equal, erecting zones in which there are two different
sets of state prosecutors with the power to proceed would seem to
decrease, rather than increase, efficiency. By introducing the possibility
70. E.C.

ALFT,

ELGIN:

DAYS

GONE

BY

ch.

21,

available

at

http://www.elginhistory.com/dgb/ch21.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005); see Buckrice, 110 111.at 34
(describing roadhouse as within seventy rods of county line).
71. See ALFT, supra note 70 ("The rural area of Hanover Township in Cook County east of Elgin
was once the location of a number of disorderly houses. Because they were outside the city limits,
they were immune from interference by the city police department and too far away to interest the
sheriffs office in Chicago. Even when evidence was gathered, authorities failed to prosecute."); cf
Murray v. Roanoke, 64 S.E.2d 804, 808 (Va. 1951) (describing purpose of Virginia buffer statute as
being "to prevent the territory contiguous to a city from becoming a refuge for criminals").
72. See generallyBuckrice, 110 111.29 (enforcing Illinois constitutional provision strictly).
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of redundancy, turf battles, or even well-meaning but cumbersome
consultation, buffer statutes can be said to disserve the goals of
efficiency as much as they serve them. If Cook and Kane counties had
had a more functional relationship that avoided such conflicts, then Kane
County officials presumably could have gotten Cook County to
prosecute Buckrice without using the buffer statute. Typically, an
alleged criminal must "run the gauntlet" once, but where most people
must convince only one prosecutor and grand jury not to indict,
defendants in buffer zones must convince tWo.7 3 This increases
convictions, but not efficiency.
There is no reason to add a buffer statute in a jurisdiction that is
already flexible in cases of multi-jurisdictional crimes and has "doubt"
statutes on the books to cover cases of border confusion. To be sure, one
could argue that sorting cases out into these precise categories is not so
simple. Rather than allow a defendant to argue that there is no border
confusion, it might be more efficient to foreclose that argument
altogether for cases that are, quite literally, on the margin. On the other
hand, it might make even more sense to foreclose the effects of the
argument, simply by ensuring that the whole issue of county lines is one
of venue, not jurisdiction, and that a defendant must challenge venue
early in the process or waive his argument.74 That would improve
efficiency, and it would also avoid the problem of long trials mooted by
technicalities.
In all, buffer statutes offer no legitimate, unique, or practical
advantages over other methods of dealing with crimes committed near
borders. The statutes cannot be justified as a matter of policy, even apart
from the damage they do as a matter of law (discussed in the next Part)
to the deeply rooted constitutional principles of trial by "juries of the
vicinage."

73. In re McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370, 377-78 (1885) (discussing unprecedented requirement
from buffer statute that defendant "run the gauntlet" twice). This situation also occurs-but is at
least unavoidable-when a crime involves elements that occur in multiple jurisdictions. See supra
notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing implications of multi-jurisdictional crimes). It also
arises for crimes that can be charged as both state and federal offenses.
74. See 2 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 306 (3d ed.

2000) ("[V]enue is a privilege provided for the benefit of the accused, rather than a limitation on the
jurisdiction of the court, and.., this privilege may be waived by the defendant.") (footnote
omitted).
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CRIMES OF THE PERIPHERY, JURIES OF THE VICINAGE

The idea that crimes should be tried before a jury of the vicinagepeople from the place where the crime was committed-is a deeply
rooted and important value, which buffer statutes subvert. This Part
discusses the history and importance of the vicinage right, and it
concludes that vicinage provides the main strike against buffer statutes,
particularly in those states where county-level vicinage is
constitutionally guaranteed.
Trials by a jury of the vicinage are important not just to defendants,
but to the victimized communities as well. The relation between buffer
statutes and the community-centered aspect of vicinage is explored in
more detail in Part III.
A.

Juriesof the Vicinage

Juries of the vicinage are deeply rooted in the Anglo-American
system. This Part revisits that history.
1.

English Experience

In England, crimes originally had to be tried in the neighborhood in
which they were committed, by a jury from that neighborhood. It could
not have been otherwise, because under the early English jury system
jurors were more akin to witnesses; they decided cases based on their
own knowledge, and they were therefore selected on that basis. 75 As the
function of jurors was separated from that of witnesses, the vicinage
expanded from the immediate neighborhood to the entire county.76
Jurors were still "local," to be sure, but the bounds of the locality had
expanded.
The local jury requirement was enforced strictly. Initially, the power
75. See Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 475 (3d Cir. 1976) (providing historical account of
English jury); see also 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359-60 (describing early jury
requirements); William Wirt Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: ConstitutionalVicinage
and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59, 60 (1944) (same).
76. See The Juries Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, § 13 (Eng.) (broadening venire to county); see also
Zicarelli, 543 F.2d at 475 (providing historical account of English shift from witness-jurors from
neighborhood to impartial jurors of county); State v. Albee, 61 N.H. 423, 424-25 (1881) (same); 3
BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *359--60 (same); Blume, supra note 75, at 60 (same); Mike
Macnair, Vicinage and the Antecedents of the Jury, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 537, 548 & n.39 (1999)
(same). To some authorities, this shift away from knowledgeable jurors eliminated the need for
strict vicinage requirements. See, e.g., Smith v. Times Publ'g Co., 36 A. 296, 297 (Pa. 1897).
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of a jury ended at the county line, including most significantly the power
to inquire into facts.77 As a result, a defendant who committed at least
one of the elements of his crime in another county could not be
prosecuted.78 In 1548, a statute established an exception to that rule in
murder cases, 79 and was the first of many such exceptions that allowed
cross-border prosecutions.8 0 In addition, when a crime was committed on
a county line, or when it was unclear in which county the actions
occurred, the common law allowed the case to be tried before a jury in
either county.8 '
It was not until 1819 that the British enacted a buffer statute. This
statute allowed prosecution for a crime committed within 500 yards of a
county line to be heard by a jury in either county. 82 This statute was
inspired by the problem of criminals in such cases "escap[ing]
unpunished from the Defect of Proof.' '8 3 Apparently, there was an
unacceptable number of cases in which either the location of the crime
or the location of the border could not be proven, making it impossible
for juries-whose power to inquire into facts that occurred in the next
county was still limited-to convict criminals who had clearly satisfied
every other requirement for conviction.
Some commentators have surmised that the sheer number of
exceptions to the vicinage principle indicates that it was not much of a
rule.84 This hypothesis may indeed be true for England, but it ignores the
strength of the vicinage principle in the United States, where there was a
77. See 4 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 530 (3d ed. 1945) (describing

English common-law history of venue).
78. See id.
79. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 24 (1548) (Eng.); see 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 530-31 (discussing
statutory change).
80. See, e.g., 8 Geo. 2, c. 20 (1735) (Eng.) (allowing prosecutions for destruction of turnpikes,
highways, and locks to occur in adjacent counties); see also 4 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 550
(discussing extent of exceptions).
81. See State ex rel. Brown v. Stewart, 19 N.W. 429, 433 (Wis. 1884) (describing common-law
standards).
82. See 59 Geo. 3, c. 96, § 2 (1819) (Eng.).
83. See id. Nine years later, a similar 500-yard buffer statute was passed for "more effectual
Prosecution" of such crimes. See The Criminal Law Act, 1826, 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, § 12 (Eng.)
(mandating 500-yard buffer "for the more effectual Prosecution of Offences committed near the
Boundaries of Counties"). This problem existed only because proving the location of the crime was
an element of the crime, as opposed to merely an incidental fact used to determine venue.
84. See, e.g., 11 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 77, at 550 (1938) ("The rules as to venue ... were
being whittled away by a growing number of exceptions and modifications, which showed that
these rules had altogether outlived their usefulness.").
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substantial affinity for strictly local juries.
2.

Colonial Underpinnings

At the time of its founding, America took the notion of local jury
trials more seriously than did England.85 Indeed, the greater importance
to Americans of trial by a jury of the vicinage loomed large in the
debates surrounding the American Revolution.
Some early colonial charters specified that trials were to be by juries
of the vicinage.86 Though the English exceptions discussed above were
fairly well entrenched in the colonies by the time the colonists revolted
and wrote their own constitutions in the 1770s and 1780s, 87 the
American process of independence added new power to the vicinage
right.
The revolutionary importance of local jury trials was driven by two
outrages. The first was the Boston Massacre in 1770. The British
soldiers who fired into a crowd of agitated Bostonians were tried by a
local jury.88 The trial was delayed until passions in the venire had
subsided, and the soldiers had the benefit of peremptory strikes on
prospective jurors; in the event, six of the eight soldier-defendants were
acquitted. 89 One can easily imagine a modem version of the massacre
trial being transferred to a less inflamed venue. To the colonists, though,
any such trial would have been a sham. Indeed, when despite the
acquittals the Crown provided that in the future such trials would be held
in England with English jurors, many rebellious colonists vehemently
disagreed. 90 The most prominent complaint found its way into the
85. See Henry G. Connor, The ConstitutionalRight to a Trial by a Jury of the Vicinage, 57 U. PA.
L. REV. 197, 205 (1909) (discussing American and Whig opposition to English practice of watering
down vicinage rights); Marvin Zalman & Maurisa Gates, Rethinking Venue in Light of the "Rodney
King" Case, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 215, 220 (1993) (contrasting English jury, bulwark against
tyranny, with American juries, institutions of democratic self-government).
86. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 17 (1951) (discussing New Jersey
charters); Drew L. Kershen, Vicinage, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 801, 814 (1976) [hereinafter Kershen,
Vicinage 1](citing charters of West Jersey and Virginia). Virginia initially did not have a strong
vicinage requirement, but evolved toward one. Id.
87. See State v. Albee, 61 N.H. 423, 426-27 (1881) (noting entrenchment of English "transitory"
statutes and corresponding reduction in power of vicinage right in America); Commonwealth v.
Collins, 74 Pa. C. 608, 614-15 (Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1919) (describing early Pennsylvania
constitutional language and statutory provisions consistent with flexible view of vicinage).
88. See Steven A. Engel, The Public's Vicinage Right: A ConstitutionalArgument, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1658, 1681-82 (2000) (recounting Boston Massacre trial).
89. See id.
90. See Connor, supra note 85, at 198-99 (discussing support for strong vicinage rights, which
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Declaration of Independence, which charged the Crown with "protecting
[troops], by a mock Trial, from punishment for any Murders which they
should commit on the Inhabitants of these States." 91
The other outrage that put the right to local jury trials at the forefront
of the Revolution involved prosecuting colonists. Not only did the
Crown require soldiers accused of killing colonists to be tried in
England, but it also whisked away colonists accused of violating the
hated Stamp Act, among other statutes. 92 These colonists were not tried
before any jury, let alone a local one. Instead, they were tried by the
admiralty court in Halifax or across the sea in England.9 3 This was a slap
in the face to those colonists who believed that, as Englishmen, they
were entitled to a trial before a local jury. This outrage too found its way
into the Declaration of Independence, in which the rebels protested
against the Crown "[f]or depriving [them] in many cases, of the benefits
transporting [them] beyond Seas to be tried
of Trial by Jury" and "[f]or
' 94
,
offences.
for pretended
These examples make clear that the jury of the vicinage was not
understood as only a defendant's right. Bostonians were not interested in
holding the Boston Massacre trial locally in order to give the colonists a
chance to acquit the British soldiers. Had the matter gone to a vote
instead of a trial, the soldiers surely would have lost. Nor were the
colonists attempting to preserve their chance to convict: They acquitted
most of the defendants, after all. Rather, the Bostonians wanted the trial
held locally because doing so would signal their power to95govern
themselves, regardless of what they chose to do with that power.
The colonists' strong sense of the vicinage right might not have
"found expression in all of the colonies"); Engel, supra note 88, at 1683-84 (recounting colonial
reaction to British Intolerable Acts).
91. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 17 (U.S. 1776).
92. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 226-27 (1999) (discussing

importance of vicinage to rebel colonists); Connor, supra note 85, at 197 (mentioning treatment of
Stamp Act violators).
93. See Connor, supra note 85, at 205-08 (discussing transportation of colonists for trial and
opposition to this practice); see also Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing
revolutionary history of vicinage); LEVY, supra note 92, at 226-27 (discussing importance of
vicinage to rebel colonists).
94. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 20-21 (U.S. 1776); see also LEVY, supra note

92, at 226-27 (discussing importance of vicinage to rebel colonists); Blume, supra note 75, at 6365 (discussing additional colonial expressions of outrage); Connor, supra note 85, at 205-08
(same).
95. Arguments regarding the importance of vicinage for self-government are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 162-65 and in Part III, infra.
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precluded the passage of county-buffer statutes (which in any case did
not arise for two more generations). There is quite a difference between
putting Bostonians on trial in Halifax or London and putting them on
trial in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The revolutionaries appeared to be
96
more concerned with the former, more extreme situation than the latter,
and that focus was evident centuries later in decisions affirming the use
of buffers.97
This distinction-ensuring jury trial in the right county versus
ensuring jury trial in the right country-makes clear that even if a state
has a strong sense that crimes should be tried by local juries, it still must
define the bounds of the "locality." In England, the county was the key
unit for the vicinage right. 98 However, the English county was a larger
geographical unit than the American county. In terms of population and
sometimes area, the English county was closer in scope to the American
state. 99 For American states to impose a county-level vicinage
requirement, therefore, would have represented change, not continuity,
because it would have made the geographical bounds of the vicinage
much smaller. 100 A state law that allowed a crime to be prosecuted in a
neighboring county thus might easily have been accepted as consistent
with English common-law notions of trial by a jury of the vicinage, even

96. See Blume, supranote 75, at 65-66.
97. See, e.g., Hemandez v. Municipal Court, 781 P.2d 547, 552 (Cal. 1989) (in bank) (accepting
non-county vicinage as consistent with historical roots of vicinage requirement because "our
citizens are no longer threatened with transportation across the seas for criminal trials"); State v.
Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869), available at 1869 WL 2333, at *4 (affirming buffer statute and
perceiving purpose of vicinage requirement as preventing party from "being dragged to a trial at a
distant part of the state") (emphasis added).
98. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
99. In 1790, England's forty traditional counties averaged about 180,000 people, while an
American state averaged 278,134 people (counting Vermont, which was not yet a state), and an
American county averaged 13,656 people. See E.A. WRIGLEY & R.S. SCHOFIELD, THE POPULATION
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1541-1871, at 534 (1989) (estimating English population); U.S. Census

Bureau, Census Data for the Year 1790 (providing data for 283 counties and fourteen states,
counting Maine and Kentucky as part of Massachusetts and Virginia, respectively), at
http://fisher.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/censusbin/census/cen.pl?year=790 (last visited Apr. 26, 2005);
see also State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 603-04 (N.C. 1906) (arguing that any North Carolina vicinage
right would not be at county level because of larger area and population of English counties); id. at
609 (Brown, J., concurring in part) (arguing that American vicinage right might still apply, but to
multi-county areas).
100. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993)
(exploring how changes in constitutional meaning can occur through faithful application of
unchanged wording). Nevertheless, this is exactly what many states did. See infra notes 123-35 and
accompanying text (relating history of state constitutional vicinage provisions).
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if it would have faced more searching review in the new states than in
England.
3.

American Experience

Despite the colonists' strong sense of a vicinage right, the
Massachusetts Constitution did not specify that crimes had to be tried by
a jury of the county in which they were committed. Rather, it declared
(and declares): "In criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts, in the
vicinity where they happen, is one of the greatest securities of the life,
liberty, and property of the citizen."''1 1 It is unclear what the Framers
meant by "vicinity," and also whether they meant this to be positive law
or merely declaratory. 10 2 It seems quite clear, though, that a buffer
statute would not necessarily conflict with this provision, not least
because, to the Framers, the paradigmatic violation of the principle of
jury of the vicinage was trial across the sea, not in the next
trial by 03
county. 1

By 1787, eight other states had constitutional provisions similar to
Massachusetts's, and three of them drew similarly vague lines, requiring
a "jury of the country,"' 1 4 or trial "where [the facts] arise."' 1 5 Three
other states were even more vague, providing only that the right to trial
by jury would remain inviolate, which may or may not have included an
implied vicinage right.' 0 6 Only two states, Georgia and New Hampshire,
101. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIII (emphasis added).
102. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 19 Mass. 550, 552 (1824) (holding provision to be
declaratory and not exclusive of legislative power to place trials in counties other than where crime
occurred); Blume, supra note 75, at 68 (discussing declaratory provisions and case law construing
them as weak).
103. See Blume, supranote 75, at 78 (discussing original states' thinking on vicinage).
104. PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 9 ("[lI]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, a
man hath a right to... a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the country ....); VT. CONST.
of 1786, Declaration of Rights § XI ("[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right
to... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the country .. ").Vermont had not yet been
admitted to the Union at this point.
105. MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII ("That the trial of facts where they
arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people.").
106. N.J. CONST. of 1776, § XXII ("[T]he inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain
confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever."); N.Y. CONST. of 1777,
§ XL1 ("[T]rial by jury, in all cases in which it hath heretofore been used in the colony of New
York, shall be established and remain inviolate forever."); N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of
Rights § IX (stating jury is to be "as heretofore used"); id. § XIV (using inviolability language for
civil juries); see Engel, supra note 88, at 1686 (surmising that vague state constitutions might have
meant to include vicinage right as intrinsic to jury trial).
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required trials to be conducted in the "county" in which the crime was
committed, and they both provided for venue in another county in
certain instances. 1 7 While most of these provisions mentioned venue,
08
not vicinage, the two went hand in hand.1
Between 1787 and 1791, the Federal Constitution and Bill of Rights
changed the landscape regarding venue and vicinage. In Article III,
Section 2, the Constitution required very specifically that federal
criminal trials be by jury, and that the venue be the state in which thecrime was committed. 0 9 Like most of the state provisions discussed in
the previous paragraph, however, the federal provision said nothing
explicit about the location from which to draw the jury. 10 Presumably, a
federal statute that allowed a crime, if it was committed close to the
border, to be prosecuted in a neighboring state would have been
constitutionally suspect.' 1
Four years later, the Sixth Amendment-which Madison originally
intended to amend Article III112-further localized this venue and
vicinage formula by requiring that the jury be "of the State and district"
Some courts have, temporarily at least, found similar language to require county-level vicinage,
but most have not. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 74 Pa. C. 608, 611 (Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1919)
(rejecting claim that local vicinage is intrinsic to jury trial); infra note 127 (discussing California
and Michigan cases finding county-level vicinage requirements).
107. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIX ("All matters of breach of the peace, felony, murder, and
treason against the State to be tried in the county where the same was committed. All matters of
dispute, both civil and criminal, in any county where there is not a sufficient number of inhabitants
to form a court, shall be tried in the next adjacent county where a court is held."); N.H. CONST. of
1784, pt. I, art. XVII ("In criminal prosecutions, the trial of facts in the vicinity where they happen,
is so essential to the security of the life, liberty and estate of the citizen, that no crime or offence
ought to be tried in any other county than that in which it is committed; except in cases of general
insurrection in any particular county, when it shall appear to the Judges of the Superior Court, that
an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the offence may be committed, and upon their
report, the assembly shall think proper to direct the trial in the nearest county in which an impartial
trial can be obtained.").
108. See 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.1.
109. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
3.
110. See id.; see also HELLER, supra note 86, at 25-26 (discussing ratification debates and
concern over lack of vicinage protection in Article III); Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86, at 81617 (discussing venue and vicinage in legislative history of Article III). Though the yearning for a
vicinage provision may have reflected a feeling of disconnection between vicinage (which was not
mentioned) and venue (which was), jurors were generally selected from the venue unless otherwise
specified. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (distinguishing venue and vicinage); infra notes
119-21 and accompanying text (discussing history of federal vicinage statutes).
111. See generally Brian C. Kalt, The Perfect Crime, 93 GEO. L.J. 675 (2005) (arguing
unconstitutionality of federal statute placing parts of Idaho and Montana in Wyoming District).
112. See Kershen, Vicinage I, supranote 86, at 819.
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where the crime was committed. 1 3 This language resulted from a
compromise. Madison had wanted to require a jury of "the vicinage,"
but opponents felt that the term was too vague-and also potentially too
strict, if it were interpreted to require county-level vicinages. 114 By using
the term "district," the Sixth Amendment left it to Congress (which
defined the bounds of federal judicial districts) to decide how local to
make federal juries.1 15 The Judiciary Act of 1789, which Congress
approved the day before the Sixth Amendment, established thirteen
state-sized districts. 16 Thus, it was not until Congress started making
smaller districts in earnest' 17 that the Sixth Amendment significantly
localized the federal vicinage requirement, or that anyone reasonably
could have seen it as doing so. 11 8
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided a notable exception to the federal
requirement that vicinage operate at the state, rather than the county,
level. The Judiciary Act provided that federal capital crimes had to be
tried in the county where they were committed or, if this was not
convenient, that at least a portion of the jury pool had to be drawn from
that county. 1 9 This provision shows that local juries were important to
113. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

114. See Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 476 (3d Cir. 1976) (describing legislative history of
Sixth Amendment); HELLER, supra note 86, at 29-34 (same); Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86, at
818-25 (same).
115. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
116. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2, 1 Stat. 73, 73 (1789). Each of the eleven states-North
Carolina and Rhode Island had not yet joined the Union-had one district, except for Massachusetts
(whose second district was what is now Maine) and Virginia (whose second district was what is
now Kentucky). Id. For a good account of the timelines of the vicinage proposals in the Bill of
Rights and the Judiciary Act, see 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.1(b); Kershen, Vicinage I,
supra note 86, at 817-57.
117. Significantly, most states-and most of the original thirteen states-still only comprise one
district each. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131 (2000) (defining bounds of district courts). For a description
of the process of the division of states into multiple districts, see Erwin C. Surrency, Federal
DistrictCourt Judges and the History of Their Courts, 40 F.R.D. 139, 147-49 (1966).
118. As Joseph Story put it:
It is observable, that the trial of all crimes is not only to be by jury, but to be held in the state,
where they are committed. The object of this clause is to secure the party accused from being
dragged to a trial in some distant state, away from his friends, and witnesses, and
neighbourhood .... Besides this; a trial in a distant state or territory might subject the party to
the most oppressive expenses, or perhaps even to the inability of procuring the proper
witnesses to establish his innocence.
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1775 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833) (emphasis added).
119. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88 (1789) ("[I]n cases punishable with death,
the trial shall be had in the county where the offence was committed, or where that cannot be done
without great inconvenience, twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from thence."); see
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the Founding generation. 120 However, the fact that federal capital crimes
were routinely tried in some other county, and that the requirement of
transporting jurors in from the location of the crime eventually
disappeared, both show that this concern for local vicinage faded in
following years. 121
Given the relative scarcity of federal prosecutions, the most
significant effect of Article III and the Sixth Amendment was that states
began parroting their language. While the vicinage provision of the Sixth
Amendment is one of the few provisions in the Bill of Rights that the
Supreme Court has never incorporated against the states, 122 many states
imposed some stricter version of it on themselves in their own
constitutions. Before 1792, virtually every state constitution with a
23
venue or vicinage provision used vague terms to describe its bounds,
Zicarelli, 543 F.2d at 477-78 (discussing Judiciary Act). At the time, federal capital crimes included
counterfeiting, treason, murder, piracy, and robbery on the high seas. See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra
note 86, at 858 n.195.
120. There is some debate as to how seriously the Framers took vicinage. See, e.g., Blume, supra
note 75, at 65-66 (positing that Framers were not concerned about very local vicinage); Kershen,
Vicinage I, supra note 86, at 828-33 (disagreeing with Blume and others). Kershen, whose mission
is to separate consideration of vicinage from venue, seems to have the most complete argument; his
entire article can, in a sense, be seen as standing for the proposition that the Founding generation
thought seriously about vicinage.
121. See Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 17, at 56-60 (describing use, repeal, and significance
of repeal of capital vicinage provision).
122. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 275 (1998) (arguing against incorporation); 1
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 2.6(b) (discussing non-incorporation of Sixth Amendment's
vicinage provision); Engel, supra note 88, at 1707-09 (arguing in favor of incorporation); Lisa E.
Alexander, Note, Vicinage, Venue, and Community Cross-Section: Obstacles to a State Defendant's
Right to Trial by a Representative Jury, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 261, 272-74 (1991) (describing
pro- and anti-incorporation authority).
123. See KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, 10 ("jury of the vicinage"); MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIII
(1780) ("verification of facts, in the vicinity where they happen"); PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9
("[I]n all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to..., in prosecutions by indictment or
information, a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the vicinage"); PA. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights § 9 ("[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to ...a
speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the country"); VT. CONST. of 1777, Declaration of Rights
§ X ("[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to... a speedy public trial, by
an impartial jury of the country ....
");VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights § 8 ("[I]n all capital or
criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to. .. a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of
his vicinage"). But see GA. CONST. of 1789, art. III, § 4 ("[C]riminal cases ...shall be tried in the
county where the crime shall be committed."); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XVII ("In criminal
prosecutions, the trial of facts in the vicinity where they happen, is so essential to the security of the
life, liberty and estate of the citizen, that no crime or offence ought to be tried in any other county
than that in which it is committed ; except in cases of general insurrection in any particular county,
when it shall appear to the Judges of the Superior Court, that an impartial trial cannot be had in the
county where the offence may be committed, and upon their report, the assembly shall think proper
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but after' 241792 most state provisions required juries to be from the
"county'
or "county or district" 125 in which the crime was
committed. 126 Two states even appear to have created, albeit
from vague
temporarily, county-level vicinage requirements
trial. These
jury
a
to
right
the
constitutional requirements preserving
a "jury" that jurors
states apparently found it inherent in the definition of
127
committed.
was
crime
the
be from the county where
to direct the trial in the nearest county in which an impartial trial can be obtained.").
124. These states and the years of their first such provision are: ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 24 (1912);
ARK. CONST. art. II, § 10 (1874); FLA. CONST. of 1885, Declaration of Rights § 11; ILL. CONST. art.
I, § 8 (1970); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(a) (1851); LA. CONST. of 1864, art. 105 ("parish"); Miss.
CONST. of 1817, art. 1, § 10; MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. I, § 10; MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 22;
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10 (1912); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 20 (1907); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 (1859);
S.C. CONST. of 1895 art. I, § 17; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9 (1870); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5 (1896,
repealed 1984); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 (1889, amended 1921); W. VA. CONST. of 1862, art. II,
§ 8.
125. These states and the years of their first such provision are: ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 10;
ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 11; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1876); FLA. CONST. of 1839, art. I,
§ 10; ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIII, § 9; IND. CONST. of 1816, art. I, § 13; KAN. CONST. of 1855,
art. I, § 10; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1857); MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. III, § 16; NEB. CONST. art.
I, § 11 (1875); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14 (1912); OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. VIII, § 11; S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 7 (1889); TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 (1896); Wis.
CONST. art. I, § 7 (1848); WYO. CONST. art. I, § 10 (1890). One state, Hawaii, refers to only the
district. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 14 (1959).
126. Most of the states that enacted vague vicinage provisions later made them more specific.
Compare ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 9 ("jury of the vicinage"), and LA. CONST. of 1812, art.
VI, § 18 ("jury of the vicinage"), and MO. CONST. of 1819, art. XIII, § 9 ("jury of the vicinage"),
with ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed"), and LA. CONST. of 1864, art. 105 ("jury of the parish in which the offence shall have
been committed"), and Mo. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 22 ("jury of the county"). Michigan removed
its vague provision altogether. CompareMICH. CONST. of 1835, art. I, § 10 ("jury of the vicinage"),
with MICH. CONST. of 1850 (containing no vicinage provision). Maine is the only post-1792 state
that has kept its vague provision. See ME. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1819) ("jury of the vicinity").
127. The first state was Michigan, whose constitution said that the right of trial by jury "shall
remain," which Justice Cooley interpreted to include juries remaining of the vicinage. Swart v.
Kimball, 5 N.W. 635, 637-38 (Mich. 1880) (overturning law allowing trial for logging violations
outside the vicinage). Cooley overlooked the fact that the previous version of the Michigan
Constitution had specified a vicinage requirement, which was excised in the then-current version.
See supra note 126; see also Blume, supra note 75, at 81 (criticizing Cooley). In any case, Swart did
not prevent the Michigan buffer statute from being applied by the Michigan Supreme Court the next
year. See Bayliss v. People, 9 N.W. 257, 257 (Mich. 1881).
The other state was California. See People v. Powell, 25 P. 481, 483-85 (Cal. 1891) (following
Swart). The Powell Court's approach has been rejected, at least to the extent that it defines the
vicinage strictly as the county of the crime. See, e.g., Price v. Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618, 636 (Cal.
2001) (requiring only "nexus" between county of crime and venue county).
In a third state, Missouri, a court struck down a buffer statute because the state constitution
required an indictment, which the court held to require a grand jury from the county where the

Washington Law Review

Vol. 80:271, 2005

Today, of the first fifteen states plus Maine (carved from
Massachusetts), eight have vague provisions ("vicinage," "vicinity,"
etc.) in their constitutions, 128 one has a specific venue provision (roughly
parroting the Federal Constitution: "county," "district," etc.), 2 9 and
seven have no venue or vicinage provision at all. 130 Of the remaining
thirty-four states, none have vague provisions, twenty-seven have
specific provisions,' 31 and only seven have no provisions at all. 132 These
crime was committed. See In re McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370, 376-79 (1885). This is somewhat
odd, however, given that the state's constitution provided a specific right to trial "by an impartial
jury of the county." MO. CONST. of 1875, art. I, § 22. Perhaps the court took this language to require
that the jury be from the venue, but not that either vicinage or venue be constitutionally tied to the
location of the crime. See also Engel, supra note 88, at 1674-81 (arguing that jury being of the
vicinage is inherent to notion of jury). It is certainly arguable that when one thinks of a jury, one
thinks of a group of people from the area of the crime, even if courts have refused to raise this
general sense to the level of a constitutional requirement.
128. Most are vicinage provisions. See KY. CONST. § 1I ("In all criminal prosecutions ... by
indictment or information, [the accused] shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the
vicinage; but the General Assembly may provide by a general law for a change of venue in such
prosecutions for both the defendant and the Commonwealth, the change to be made to the most
convenient county in which a fair trial can be obtained."); ME. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to... have a speedy, public and impartial trial, and,
except in trials by martial law or impeachment, by a jury of the vicinity."); PA. CONST. art. I, § 9
("In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to... , in prosecutions by indictment or
information, a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage ....
");VT. CONST. ch. I, art.
10 ("[lI]n all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a person hath a right to... a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the country .. ");VA. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("That in criminal prosecutions a
man,
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of his vicinage ....).
Others are venue provisions. See MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 20 ("[T]he trial of facts,
where they arise, is one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estate of the People.");
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIII ("In criminal prosecutions, the verification of facts in the vicinity
where they happen, is one of the greatest securities of the life, liberty, and property of the citizen.");
N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 17 ("In criminal prosecutions, the trial of facts, in the vicinity where they
happened, is so essential to the security of the life, liberty and estate of the citizen, that no crime or
offense ought to be tried in any other county or judicial district than that in which it is
committed ...").
129. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, 6 ("[A]II criminal cases shall be tried in the county where the
crime was committed .. ").The federal language of "state and district" appears in U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
130. The seven states are Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, and South Carolina.
131. Twelve states require trial in a particular "district" or "county or district." See ALA. CONST.
art. I, § 6 ("[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right... in all prosecutions by
indictment, [to] a speedy, public trial, by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the
offense was committed .. ");COLO. CONST. art. II, § 16 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed."); HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 14 ("In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
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ascertained by law .... ); KAN. CONST., Bill of Rights § 10 ("In all prosecutions, the accused shall
be allowed.., to have.., a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed."); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
county or district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which county or district shall have
been previously ascertained by law."); MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 24 ("In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, subject to the right of the state to have a
change ofvenue for any of the causes for which the defendant may obtain the same."); NEB. CONST.
art. I, § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to.. . a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed."); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 14 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed."); S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7 ("In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right.., to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
in which the offense is alleged to have been committed."); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12 ("In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right.., to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed .. "); WIS. CONST.
art. I, § 7 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right.., in prosecutions by
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
wherein the offense shall have been committed; which county or district shall have been previously
ascertained by law."); WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right.., to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed. When the location of the offense cannot be established with
certainty, venue may be placed in the county or district where the corpus delecti [sic] is found, or in
any county or district in which the victim was transported.").
Fourteen states limit trial to a particular county. See ARmZ. CONST. art. II, § 24 ("In criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall have the right.., to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed .... "); ARK. CONST. art. II,
§ 10 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by
impartial jury of the county in which the crime shall have been committed...."); FLA. CONST. art.
I, § 16(a) (providing right to "a speedy and public trial by impartial jury in the county where the
crime was committed"); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed."); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(a) ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have
been committed .. "); LA. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("Every person charged with a crime.., is entitled
to a speedy, public, and impartial trial in the parish where the offense or an element of the offense
occurred, unless venue is changed in accordance with law."); MISS. CONST. art. III, § 26 ("In all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to..., in all prosecutions by indictment or
information, a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was
committed .... ); MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) ("[I]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to... a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county."); OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 10 ("In
any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed.., to have ... a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed .... "); OKLA.
CONST. art. II, § 20 ("In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the crime shall have been committed or,
where uncertainty exists as to the county in which the crime was committed, the accused may be
tried in any county in which the evidence indicates the crime might have been committed.")
(emphasis added); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11 ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
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provisions are depicted on the map below.

right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been
committed .. ");TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the
right to... in prosecutions by indictment or presentment, a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury
of the County in which the crime shall have been committed ....
");WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("In
criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right.., to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county in which the offense is charged to have been committed ..... );W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 14 ("Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein otherwise provided, shall
be by a jury of twelve men, public, without unreasonable delay, and in the county where the alleged
offence was committed, unless upon petition of the accused, and for good cause shown, it is
removed to some other county."). Note that Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Oregon, and West Virginia
technically require venue, not vicinage. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
The final state ties trial loosely to particular counties. California's vicinage requirement is a
matter of case law. See Price, 25 P.3d at 636 (requiring "nexus" between location of crime and
venue).
132. The seven states are Alaska, Iowa, Idaho, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, and Texas.
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Commentators have disagreed over whether the specific provisions
reflect a genuine concern about ensuring a jury of the vicinage or instead
133. This Map illustrates the constitutional provisions cited in notes 128-32, supra.
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show that states just carelessly copied the Federal Constitution 3 4 and
Blackstone's account of common-law county-level vicinage.' 35 Careless
or not, the translation of the federal-district-wide vicinage right into a
stricter county-wide vicinage right is significant and justifiable. Because
there are more state crimes and criminal defendants than there are
federal crimes and criminal defendants, more state courts are needed.
More courts mean smaller geographical divisions. Conversely, federal
courts have wider geographical purviews. Thus it makes much more
sense to require only state courts to consider vicinage at the county level,
136
because only they have that sort of presence on the ground.
Moreover, federal crimes deal with broader interests, while state
crimes deal with more local ones-at least ideally. When someone
commits a crime, it is an offense against the "community," but federal
crimes can be seen as an offense against a broader, national community
("United States v. Defendant," as opposed to "State v. Defendant" or
"City v. Defendant"). Ensuring that the jury is drawn from the
"community," then, means something different in the federal context-a
broader geography-than it does in the state context.
If states want to guarantee the use of local juries, and if some of them
want to define "local" along county lines, then they should feel free to
do so. Venue and vicinage are not, however, such simple matters. There
are many cases in which local trial is seen as offending other state or
federal constitutional guarantees, most prominently the right to an
impartial jury, which can necessitate a change of venue.1 37 In this age of
plea bargains, jury trial is now the overwhelming exception rather than
the rule, and this moots the question of where jurors are from in a large
majority of cases. All of that said, however, a solid majority of states
still guarantee a jury of a specific vicinage in their constitutions, and that
must mean something, even if legislators and judges do not always heed
134. See Blume, supra note 75, at 89 (surmising that "county or district" language in state
constitutions merely aped Federal Constitution).
135. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (citing Blackstone and discussing commonlaw approach to vicinage); ef Levitt, supra note 19, at 335 (labeling continued requirement of
county-level vicinage as "nothing less than stupidity"); B.J. George, Jr., ExtraterritorialApplication
of PenalLegislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 635-36 (1966) (expressing similar sentiments).
136. In one instance where the federal government did require county-level vicinage, it often
moved venue elsewhere and brought in jurors from the county of the crime, until even this nod to
the county was repealed. See supra notes 119-21 and accompanying text (discussing county-level
vicinage requirement for capital trials in Judiciary Act of 1789).
137. See infra text accompanying notes 160-61, 208 (discussing interaction of impartiality and

vicinage).

Vicinage and Criminal Buffers
it.
B.

Evaluating the Vicinage Right

Vicinage requirements made sense centuries ago when jurors were
also witnesses.1 38 The persistence of these requirements after jurors
became "blank slates" for the reception of evidence, however, is
something of a puzzle. 139 Given their continued vitality, there must be
some reason why local juries are thought to be better than foreign or
random ones. On the other hand, vicinage rules are riddled with so many
exceptions that one can argue that they are meaningless, persisting only
to the extent that they have not gotten in the way of other interests and
values. 140
The simplest argument in favor of local juries is efficiency. Given that
evidence and witnesses will generally be found in and around the scene
of the crime, it makes sense to hold the trial there. 141 Defendants are
often found near the crime too, as most people do not stray far from
home when they commit crimes. 42 Exceptions in individual cases
abound, but as a default presumption, trial by a local jury is a pretty
good one from the standpoint of having an inexpensive trial.
If this were the only reason to use local juries, however, there would
be little reason to constitutionalize venue and vicinage. 43 Given that
most states provide for a jury of the vicinage explicitly as a right of
criminal defendants, 144 it must have advantages for them. Indeed, at the
time of the Founding, this was the crux of the debate over vicinage.145
The Founders saw it as unfair and inhumane to transport criminal
defendants far away from home, where they would be isolated and

138. See supra text accompanying note 75.
139. See Blume, supra note 75, at 60-61 (describing emergence of blank-slate paradigm
alongside vicinage changes); Levitt, supra note 19, at 327 (speculating as to reasons for persistence
of local juries).
140. See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86, at 804 (noting decline in independent consideration
of vicinage since time of Founding). See generally Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 17 (recounting
in detail decline in regard for vicinage).
141. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 108 (2003) (describing
administrative advantages of local juries).
142. See infra note 146 (discussing local criminals).
143. To be sure, several states do not, but all of those states have statutory provisions that achieve
the same end. See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 128, 131.

145. See Kershen, Vicinage I, supranote 86, at 810-11 & n.26.
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rootless and probably represented146by a local lawyer not of their
choosing, before ajury of strangers.
Requiring local juries also prevents prosecutors from juryshopping. 147 While most defendants might not want a jury drawn from
the community they allegedly just victimized, others might prefer a jury
that has to live with the results of its decisions and may as a result be
more careful or skeptical. A defendant also might feel that a local jury,
with whom he or she may share cultural values, economic status, racial
identity, or just a general sense of community identity, would
sympathize with him more than with the police or the victim. Either
way, a consistent rule requiring local juries puts the defendant on equal
footing with the prosecutor, who cannot manipulate the likely results of
the trial by selecting the jurisdiction with the toughest jurors. Both sides
know in advance where the jury will be from.
Local juries have other advantages apart from the benefits they confer
on defendants. They also represent unique institutional competence. If
the purpose of a jury is to act as a check on the overzealous prosecutor
or the corrupt judge, then it is imperative that the jury be local. 48 The
same people who (in some states) elect prosecutors and judges work
alongside those officials when serving on juries, and thus have a direct
role in keeping them honest. 149 Given that local jurors have to live with
the decisions that these prosecutors and judges make, these jurors have
heightened incentives to fulfill their role vigorously.
Local juries also possess another type of institutional competence.

146. See State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 787 (1883); infra note 188 and accompanying text
(discussing defendant's-rights view of vicinage). This presumes, of course, that the criminal was
from the neighborhood in which he committed the crime, an assumption that the Framers were
comfortable making. See Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86, at 810-11 & n.26; see also In re
McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370, 377 (1885) ("While the situs of the offence draws to it the venue, the
law, which in dealing with a principle always generalizes, proceeds upon the assumption that the
citizen ordinarily moves and acts about his residence-his home.") (italics in original). But see State
v. Brown, 154 A. 579, 580 (Vt. 1931) (expressing unwillingness to assume offenders live near
crime scenes).
147. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1660; see also 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 16.1(b)
("Imposing a vicinage requirement also prohibited the prosecutor from 'jury-shopping' by selecting
that community most likely to produce jurors receptive to the prosecution's point of view.").
148. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (stating one purpose ofjuries is to act as
"hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor") (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
155-56 (1968)); cf State v. Vejvoda, 438 N.W.2d 461, 465 (Neb. 1989) (holding that right to local
trial is waived if defendant opts for bench trial).
149. See Kaseris v. Justice Court, 144 P.2d 469, 473-74 (Idaho 1943) (Dunlap, J., dissenting)
(criticizing buffer statute on grounds that justice of the peace is elected from county and not buffer).

Vicinage and Criminal Buffers
Their appreciation of local customs and norms allows them to properly
evaluate the facts in cases that implicate such things. 150 In such
instances, there is no substitute for a local jury. Those who subscribe to
an absolute notion of truth, of course, may reject this argument. Jurors,
however, must be more than just a quaint anachronism, kept in place to
pantomime in service to the requirement that courts cannot direct a
guilty verdict. Even in an age where jurors no longer construe the law, 151
it is easy to see that jurors have discretion in all sorts of cases. They
determine, for instance, whether the force used against a policeman was
"reasonable" (as in the Terrell case with which this Article opened) or
whether an allegedly obscene act violated community standards.
For those who believe that truth is socially constructed at least to
some degree-and if it were not, we would likely not need twelve jurors
rather than one judge-the question of who is doing the constructing is
key.' 52 Put another way, one could say that the assessment of guilt in a
criminal trial requires the finder of fact to interpret facts, not just "find"
them. There are two advantages to making sure that local citizens are
constructing and interpreting the law: a sort of accuracy and a sort of
democracy.
As already mentioned, a local jury may be more accurate when proper
adjudication requires knowledge of local customs or contexts. Local
juries may also be better at evaluating the credibility of witnesses. In
cases that turn on credibility-and many do, given that the defendant
only needs a reasonable doubt-jurors who make judgments about
150. One court put it as follows:
When [jurors] were required to find their verdict upon the evidence of witnesses, it was still
deemed important that they should come from the place where the witnesses lived and where
the dispute originated, since jurors from the visne or neighborhood were regarded as more
likely to be qualified to investigate and determine the truth than persons living at a distance
from the scene of the transaction.
Brown, 154 A. at 579-80; see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) ("[T]he essential
feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen .. "); JONAKAIT, supra note 141, at 108-12 ("Those
from the local community more readily understand the evidence and see its possible
interpretations.").
151. Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 17, at 80, 86-87 (noting that juries reflected sense of
community more effectively when they had more power to ignore instructions); Zalman & Gates,
supra note 85, at 220 (noting democratic nature of American juries, particularly when they decided
issues of law).
152. See JONAKAIT, supra note 141, at 64-74; Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury
Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 MD. L. REv. 107, 141-43 (1994) (discussing importance of
demographics in arriving at proper social construction of facts); see also JONAKAIT, supra note 141,
at 42-45 (describing general advantages of groups in recall and interpretation of evidence).
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witnesses need to do so with the best understanding of local mores.
Indeed, there is evidence that this is an accurate description of how
jurors make their decisions. One study of jury decision making that
examined actual cases showed that jurors almost always took local
knowledge into account in criminal cases with less-than-overwhelming
evidence.' 53 A fine example of this is a case, reported in that study, in
which jurors disbelieved a witness who said he had never heard of a
particular tavern. 154 Someone who lived where this witness lived, the
jurors concluded, could not credibly make that claim.'5 5
This use of local knowledge brings us back to the pre-modern purpose
of local juries-to bring local knowledge to bear' 56 --and thus raises a
problem in the jury's proper performance of its duties. If jurors base
their decision on personal knowledge instead of the evidence presented
to them, they violate their charge. In this way, foreign juries are good
because, lacking such specialized knowledge, jurors will not so
transgress.
Significantly, this very exchange over the proper role of juries
occurred when the framers of the Sixth Amendment debated vicinage
requirements in the 1780s and 90S.157 The way the Framers resolved the
issue is instructive. First, the Sixth Amendment does not require a very
localized jury, just one from roughly the same state. 158 As with their
English forebears, the Framers wanted the jury to be local enough to be
generally knowledgeable, but not so local as to be personally
involved. 159 Second, and relatedly, the Sixth Amendment requires local
153. See Dale W. Broeder, The Impact of the VicinageRequirement: An Empirical Look, 45 NEB.
L. REV. 99, 101-08 (1966) (describing University of Chicago Jury Project).
154. Id. at 106.

155. Id.
156. See supranote 75 and accompanying text.
157. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1686 (describing Founding-era resolution of tension between
local juries and partiality); Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86, at 834-35 (discussing Founding-era
debates over vicinage).
158. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
159. Blackstone put it as follows:
[B]y the policy of the antient law, the jury was to come de vicineto, from the neighbourhood of
the vill or place where the cause of action was laid in the declaration : and therefore some of
the jury were obliged to be returned from the hundred in which such vill lay .... For, living in
the neighbourhood, they were .. . supposed to know beforehand the characters of the parties
and witnesses, and therefore they better knew what credit to give to the facts alleged in
evidence. But this convenience was overbalanced by another very natural and almost
unavoidable inconvenience ; that jurors, coming out of the immediate neighbourhood, would
be apt to intermix their prejudices and partialities in the trial of right. And this our law was so
sensible of, that it for a long time has been gradually relinquishing this practice .. . the jury
being now only to come de corporecomitatus, from the body of the county at large, and not de
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16
juries in the same breath with which it requires impartial ones. 0
Therefore, if a party believes that a juror is unable to follow instructions,
or has personal knowledge or belief that will prejudice him or her, that
party can exclude that juror. In reality, jurors might still bring improper
considerations into their deliberations, but the rest of the system ensures
that the parties at least have a chance to root out the worst jurors. More
to our point, it ensures, at the very least, that the jurors' personal
suppositions will be based on local knowledge and experience rather
than ignorance or prejudice. Impartiality and local vicinage are a
package deal. 16 ' That is the ideal, anyway.
The second sort of institutional competence relates to a separate
notion about local juries: that they are an essential component of
democratic self-government. 162 When a jury decides a case in which the
law must be applied to particular facts, the jury is, in essence, deciding
what the standards for conduct in the community will be. 163 Police

vicineto, or from the particular neighbourhood.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *359-60.

160. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88
(1789) (requiring jurors be from county of crime in capital cases, but also that they be selected "so
as shall be most favourable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur an unnecessary expense, or
unduly to burthen the citizens of any part of the district with such services"); Kershen, Vicinage II,
supra note 17, at 83, 140-46 (arguing for enforcement of both rights, not impartiality at expense of
vicinage). But see HELLER, supra note 86, at 95 (arguing that vicinage and impartiality are at "cross
purposes").
161. See infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing interaction of impartiality and
vicinage). But see N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XVII ("[N]o crime or offence ought to be tried in
any other county than that in which it is committed; except in cases of general insurrection in any
particular county, when.., an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where the offence may be
committed .... ).
162. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (listing as "essential feature of a jury"
notion of "community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence"); AMAR, supra note 122, at 94-95; JONAKAIT, supra note 141,
at 109 ("[T]he consequences of a trial often fall most heavily on the trial's community."); Engel,
supra note 88, at 1661, 1695-98 (discussing self-governing nature of local juries); Kershen,
Vicinage I, supra note 86, at 839-40 (discussing community-centered vision of vicinage); Kershen,
Vicinage II, supra note 17, at 83, 86-87 (arguing that juries of the vicinage "articulate the sense of
justice of the community"); Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal
Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1533, 1546-56 (1993) (discussing community-centered view of vicinage
and providing examples for specific crimes of application of community norms); Zalman & Gates,
supra note 85, at 267-68; cf John J. Murphy, Revising Domestic Extradition Law, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 1063, 1087 (1983) (describing healing power of local trial on stricken community).
163. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1660-61; see also JONAKAIT, supra note 141, at 64-74
(describing facility of juries for bringing community values to bear in verdicts); cf Brown, supra
note 152, at 123-24 (contrasting capital cases, where jury reflects individual sensibilities, with
obscenity cases, where jury speaks for community sensibilities).
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brutality provides an instructive example. If a jury decides that a police
officer did not use excessive force in a particular case, it is in essence
saying, "what this policeman did was not a crime."' 64 By deciding a
series of cases, a series of juries communicates to prosecutors what will
and will not result in a conviction in that locale. Juries need not perform
this communication through nullification, but if they do, local juries at
least provide relative accountability, and through it, legitimacy. If a jury
is going to let a criminal go free in its own streets, as opposed to
someone else's,
it will presumably be more thoughtful and careful about
65
case.1
the
There is no substitute for a jury of the vicinage.166 For a jury to
determine the standards of another community would toss away the
institutional competence that local juries represent. As the next Part will
make clear, however, buffer statutes contravene the benefits of local
juries, and present other vicinage-related problems as well.
C.

Buffer Statutes and Vicinage

Buffer statutes may conflict with constitutional vicinage
requirements, and they definitely interfere with the goals of local juries.
If a state's constitutional rules are strict and explicitly limit trials and/or
juries to the county where the offense was committed, then buffer
statutes are obviously incompatible. In a state with a strict constitutional
vicinage requirement, buffer statutes unconstitutionally allow a crime
committed in one county to be tried in another county before a jury from
that other county.
164. Cf Levenson, supra note 162, at 1563 (listing survey data on gulf between white and black
perceptions of police use of force).
165. See JONAKAIT, supra note 141, at 109 ("Because a community-based jury may have a higher
stake in making a correct decision, they may pay closer attention to the proceedings."); Kershen,
Vicinage II, supranote 17, at 83, 87-94 (arguing that, through avoiding "bifurcated responsibility,"
local juries minimize nullification and lend more legitimacy to that which still occurs); Zalman &
Gates, supra note 85, at 273 (surmising that Rodney King case acquittals would have been accepted
had venue and vicinage not been changed).
This advantage of local juries can be turned on its head, of course. Nullification might be a bad
thing in, say, a lynching case in which the enfranchised community is sympathetic to the defendants
rather than the victim. See JONAKAIT, supra note 141, at 110. This problem explains some anti"juries of the vicinage" statutes. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 55 S.E. 600, 602 (N.C. 1906) (discussing
lynching statute that required notification to all adjoining counties of lynching and allowed any of
them to prosecute because of "prejudice or sympathy which in cases of lynching usually and
naturally pervades the county where that offense is committed").
166. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1665 (criticizing notions of virtual representation in transferredvenue cases).

Vicinage and Criminal Buffers

1.

Working Around Vicinage Provisions

There are a few ways in which a buffer statute might not transgress
even a strict constitutional vicinage requirement. First, to avoid
constitutional problems, some courts have construed buffer statutes
narrowly and applied them only when there is doubt as to the location of
a crime.1 67 Indeed many states do not use buffers in cases where the
essentially transforming their buffer statutes
location of a crime is16clear,
8
statutes.
"doubt"
into
Another, less acceptable, way in which courts may permit buffers in a
county-vicinage state is by construing the constitutional vicinage
requirement as flexible enough to allow for marginal legislative
exceptions, and thereby construing the buffer statute as a mere de
minimis violation.169 While some rules provide brighter lines than others,
a constitutional vicinage provision that relies on a literal line, like a
well-marked county border, is probably not the best candidate for this
type of loose construction.
Third, and least acceptable of all, a court may require no exception to
the vicinage rule at all. If the constitution speaks of placing the trial and
drawing the jury from the "county or district" in which the crime was
committed (instead of just the "county"), then a court may find the
buffer statute simply provides a fancy way for the legislature to define a
"district" to include a county plus the ribbon of land just outside of it.
Many courts have adopted this very interpretation. 7 °
This interpretation ignores two things, however. First, a constitutional
requirement that limits trials and juries to a "place certain" defined by
the legislature hardly seems compatible with a law that defines swathes
of the state as being in two "places" at once. Such a constitutional
requirement is also incompatible with a buffer system that favors
by requiring defendants to run two gauntlets instead of
prosecutors
17 1
one.

167. Some states achieve this through statutory language, while others have done so when their
courts found a constitutional requirement to so limit their buffer statutes. See supra note 42. Other
states may do this in practice at the prosecutor's discretion. See supra note 31.
168. Doubt statutes are discussed in notes 42 and 60-61, and accompanying text, supra.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 223-25 (discussing de minimis arguments further).
170. See, e.g., State v. Lehman, 279 P. 283, 284-85 (Or. 1929); State ex rel. Brown v. Stewart, 19
N.W. 429, 433 (Wis. 1884); see also State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869), available at 1869 WL
2333, at *4 (noting multi-county nature of districts).
171. See supranote 73 and accompanying text.
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Second, it is inappropriate for a legislature to define the vicinage
more narrowly than the venue. That is, a state should not define the
"district" as comprising the county plus a 500-yard ribbon outside it, but
then define the "vicinage" as comprising just the county. Doing so
would ensure that people from the buffer zone could "only appear as
culprits" in a neighboring county's court, and never appear as jurors
172
there, a notion that is incompatible with democratic self-government.
It also would ensure that when the buffer statute is used, the jurors are
deciding a case that, by definition, does not affect their immediate
community. Conversely, the community directly affected by the alleged
crime is precluded from evaluating it. Such community preclusion does
not pose a constitutional problem in most cases. Courts have fairly
consistently allowed courts to summon jurors from some subset of a
county or district (usually the area around the courthouse) rather than
drawing from the entire county, and this reasoning would most likely
apply in the case of buffer statutes. 73 As a matter of policy, though, this
community preclusion is unfair, 174 especially in states where counties are
small enough, or courts spread out enough, that everyone has a chance to
serve on a jury somewhere. Simply defining the vicinage as equal to the
venue would mean, of course, that people living in the buffer zone
would be susceptible to double the rate of jury service because they
172. State v. Voris, 8 Ohio N.P. 16, 17-18 (Police Ct. 1900) (striking down statute extending
jurisdiction of municipal court with municipal juries to entire county); cf Brown, 19 N.W. at 433
(raising, but leaving undecided, question of whether jurors living in buffer are susceptible to jury
service).
173. See Zicarelli v. Gray, 543 F.2d 466, 479-82 & n.69 (3d Cir. 1976) (discussing case law and
citing Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480, 482 (1918)); Kershen, Vicinage 11, supranote 17,
at 106-09 (discussing and criticizing case law); cf Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 73, 88
(1789) (directing that jurors "shall be returned as there shall be occasion for them, from such parts
of the district from time to time as the court shall direct"); 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 264 (Professional Books 1971) (1736) (indicating that at common law jurors
could come from any part of county). But see Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 898-903 (Alaska
197 1) (finding cross-section violation from trying crime from remote native village by jury drawn
from fifteen-mile radius around Anchorage). The buffer example is distinguishable in one sense. If a
county has all of its juries drawn from one geographical subset of that county, at least that subset is
subject to the precedents it sets in those cases. A jury is always only a subset of the community it
adjudges anyway. In buffer cases, by contrast, the defendant and the victimized community are
"others," and the jury is not a part of that which it judges.
174. Some have praised the Alvarado rule ("[W]e must adhere to a notion of community which at
least encompasses the location of the alleged offense."), Alvarado, 486 P.2d at 902, though few
courts have. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 122, at 274-85 (describing various state approaches to
vicinage, including lonely Alvarado); id. at 287-88, 293 (praising Alvarado); see also People v.
Jones, 510 P.2d 705, 709-10 (Cal. 1973) (in bank) (relying on Alvarado), overruledby Hernandez
v. Municipal Court, 781 P.2d 547, 548-49 (Cal. 1989) (in bank).

Vicinage and Criminal Buffers
would live in two vicinages. States that are serious about vicinage but
deeply attached to their buffer statutes would have to make this sacrifice.
In the face of these arguments about the pitfalls of trying cases before
"foreign" juries, one can of course counter-argue that jurors would apply
the same standards to any case on which they sat, regardless of whether
the facts arose on their street, somewhere else in the county, or in
another county altogether. On the other hand, jurors might find it easier
in buffer cases to dissociate the facts they are deciding from the
standards that they would want applied to themselves, because they are
175
Relatedly, a decision
applying their standards to another community.
apply to the forum
not
rendered by a buffer jury, because it literally does
county, might be less likely to add to that body of decisional law that
defines the standards of the forum community.
2.

Buffers and Local Juries

Buffer statutes may also sacrifice (or, at the very least, fail to
promote) the benefits of local juries discussed in Part II.B. The idea that
trials are most easily held near where the crime occurred, where the
witnesses live, and where the evidence is found, might militate in favor
of eschewing buffers. It also might not, to be sure. Not all counties are
geometrically perfect or equally sized. Because not all county
courthouses are situated in their counties' geographic centers, there are
plenty of places in plenty of counties that are closer to the next county's
court than to their own. Even if it would be a good idea to allow trial in
the nearest courthouse instead of the county courthouse, though, buffer
statutes are not premised on, or limited to, moving trials to the
courthouse nearest to the crime.
Similarly, buffer statutes may threaten the institutional competence of
local juries. As discussed in Part II.B, local knowledge and the proper
social construction of the facts of a case require local juries. It might be
the case here, too, that a jury from the next county may execute its duties
as well, or even better, than a jury from the forum county. A case from
the rural fringes of a county with an urban core might, for instance, be
more appropriately tried by the citizens of the rural county next door.
Buffer statutes are not based on, or limited to, such situations, however.
While buffers may provide a more suitable jury in some cases, they may
just as easily provide a less suitable one in other cases by moving a rural
175. See Kershen, Vicinage 1H, supra note 17, at 84 (arguing that jurors take their task more
seriously if they are deciding local matter).
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trial to a neighboring county's urban seat. Any such county line, after
all, will have buffers on both sides of it.
Buffer statutes conflict more directly with the other goals of local
juries, most obviously the prevention of forum shopping by
prosecutors. 176 If two counties' prosecutors are coordinated enough to
work out which of them should pursue a case, it is possible that their
discussion would turn on mundane considerations: Does one county
have a greater interest in the case? Has one county taken the
prosecutorial lead already? And so on. Indeed, some of the prosecutors
informally surveyed for this project indicated that they do discuss these
considerations. 1 77 It is unlikely, however, that prosecutors would
completely ignore the question of which jurisdiction would be more
likely to produce a conviction. 178 (If, alternatively, the two prosecutors
were not so well in tune, then a buffer statute would provide ample
opportunity for turf wars, which would serve no one well.)
The ability of juries to serve as a check on overzealous prosecutors
and judges is incompatible with buffer statutes. One point of having
local juries try cases is that they have to live with the results. If a local
jury feels that a prosecution is improper, it can acquit, and this
consideration is sharpened by the knowledge that the same prosecutor
could prosecute any of the jurors. If a case can be deflected-say,
portrayed as the act of a zealous prosecutor projecting the power of the
county outward against the "others" in the next county-then the selfregarding mechanism is absent.
3.

CrossingBright Lines

All of the conflicts discussed in the previous Parts mean, simply, that
if a state is serious about county-level vicinage, it cannot use a buffer
statute-and states should be serious about county-level vicinage.
County lines have consequences. Every county is different from its
neighbor. Some might argue that the next best thing to a trial in one's
own county is a trial in the next one, and this belief has animated some
venue statutes and transfer cases. 179 However, even assuming that "next
176. See supra notes 65, 147, and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Mahoney, Mosely, Poyner, Roberts, Stassi, and Yunker interviews, supra note 31;
Telephone Interview by Lance Werner with Val Solino, Chief of Appeals Division, Orleans Parish
District Attorney, La. (Oct. 3, 2003) ("There are no turf battles.").
178. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
179. See, e.g., Newberry v. Commonwealth, 66 S.E.2d 841, 844-45 (Va. 1951) (allowing transfer
of case to next county for lack of qualified jurors, and collecting common-law authorities).
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best" is good enough, "next to" does not always deliver it. When people
decide where to live, they are deciding to be on one side of a line and not
on the other. Those choices may be based on pure preference, but they
may also result from external economic or cultural forces. In either case,
by definition, neighboring counties may contrast with each other in a
more direct way than randomly disconnected counties do. For instance,
county-line racial and socioeconomic segregation abound, including
extreme examples like Eight Mile Road in Michigan.' 80 In racial terms,
many counties that are mostly white sit alongside counties that are
mostly black, Hispanic, or Native American. 181 In economic terms, the
very wealthy often live in counties next to the very poor. 182 There is
significant and compelling evidence that the socioeconomic and
demographic composition of juries affects their deliberations and
verdicts. 83 The next county might not, therefore, be the best substitute
source of jurors.
Some adjacent counties are more different than others, though, and
plenty of neighboring counties are demographically and economically
similar. Even in these situations, however, county borders can represent
important contrasts. 184 Terrain, population density, and property tax rates
might vary, for instance. Even lacking these sorts of differences,
counties are at least distinct in the sense that they govern themselves.
Two counties might be identical in every other way, but each may elect
its own prosecutor and judges.' 85 If a state crime occurs in a known

180. See supra notes 3-4 (discussing demographic data on both sides of Eight Mile).
181. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MAPPING CENSUS 2000: THE GEOGRAPHY OF U.S. DIVERSITY,

available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/atlas.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2005). This outstanding resource provides national county maps broken down by race, making stark
divides plain to the eye. If a state with a buffer statute also contains an Indian reservation over
which its jurisdiction is limited, this obviously trumps the buffer.
182. The Census Bureau's interactive site, found at http://factfinder.census.gov, allows users to
create "thematic maps" that color each county according to income. Specific data is available by
clicking on a particular county. This makes stark divides plain to the eye.
183. See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
DeliberatingGroups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 673-74 (2001) (collecting research and
concluding that juries favor socioeconomically and demographically similar defendants).
184. See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 162, at 1562 (noting problems with assumption that jury in
other county with similar demographics will make same decisions as local jury).
185. See supra text accompanying note 149. In an even broader sense, sending a trial to a jury in
the next county, even a demographically similar one, smacks of a sort of virtual representation that
is, and should be, disfavored. Presumably, few Americans would agree to let, say, their mayor be
chosen by the voters in some other town just because the people in the other town had a similar
distribution of income and skin color.
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location, there is one local prosecutor whose job is to decide whether
prosecution is warranted. That prosecutor is accountable to his or her
constituency; the prosecutor may base his or her decision on past
experience with juries drawn from that constituency, and how the voters
affected by the crime feel the case has been handled. In this way, each
county develops its own norms for the enforcement of its criminal laws.
When a crime occurs in a buffer zone, this accountability breaks
down. If the location is known, the relevant prosecutor is known too. If
that prosecutor does not wish to prosecute, however, there is now
another prosecutor-not elected with any votes from the buffer-who
can step in. When this case is sent to a court presided over by a judge
and jury who are all foreign to the buffer, the norms and accountability
that were carefully developed for the county where the crime occurred
become irrelevant. The defendant is tried by another community, one
with power over him but virtually no interest in what he has done. The
community that does have an interest is stripped of its power to vindicate
it.
For all of these reasons, buffer statutes do damage to the deeplyrooted tradition of local juries. They contravene the policy of local
juries, and they should be read as violating constitutional requirements
of local juries as well. Admittedly, courts seem not to care about the
policy point, and on the constitutional point they are split. More than a
86
dozen states' courts have either upheld or struck down buffer statutes.
No state court has ever struck down (or, apparently, considered striking
down) a buffer statute on any ground other than a state constitutional
guarantee of vicinage. On the other hand, about half of the buffer
statutes have been approved or never seriously challenged, including
several in states with constitutional vicinage requirements. 187 For the
sake of the principle of local juries, this level of acceptance for buffer
statutes should not be.
III.

COUNTY-LINE BUFFER STATUTES AND THE WEAK
COMMUNITY-CENTERED CONCEPTION OF THE JURY

The previous Parts of this Article explored and criticized county-line
buffer statutes, both for their policy deficiencies and for their
incompatibility with the law and traditions of local juries. This Part takes

186. See supra note 40.
187. See supra notes 46-50.
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a slightly different approach and focuses on the community-centered
argument in support of juries of the vicinage. Some have argued that the
key right to local jury trials belongs to the community, not the criminal
defendant. While buffer statutes can be criticized for contravening this
community right, the actual treatment of buffer statutes in state courtseven those invalidating the statutes-makes clear that the communitycentered view of local juries is rarely if ever raised by defendants, and
that courts are not receptive to it when (or if) it is raised.
A.

The Community-Centered Conception of the Jury of the Vicinage

In the federal system and in most states, criminal defendants have a
right to be tried by a jury of the vicinage. For the most part, and for most
of its history, the conventional understanding of vicinage has been
dominated by a defendant-centered approach. As one court's
representative articulation of this defendant-centered understanding of
vicinage put it:
The object of this provision is to protect the defendant against a
spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of our rulers, and
against a spirit of violence and vindictiveness on the part of the
people; and also to secure the party accused from being dragged
to a trial at a distant part of the state, away from his friends and
witnesses and neighborhood, and thus to be subject to the
verdict of mere strangers, who may feel no common sympathy,
or who may even cherish animosities or prejudices against him,
as well as the necessity of incurring the most oppressive
of procuring the
expenses, or, perhaps, even to the inability
1 88
innocence.
his
establish
to
proper witnesses
189
While arguments over the scope of "vicinage" have long abounded,
little attention has been paid to the nature of the right itself. In the last
few decades, though, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to
an alternative, community-centered conception of the vicinage right.
These scholars have argued that juries of the vicinage serve as
institutions of local self-government-a function that is as important as
188. State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869), available at 1869 WL 2333, at *4; accord State v.
Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 787 (1883); 3 STORY, supra note 118, § 1775; see also State ex rel. Scott v.
Crinklaw, 59 N.W. 370, 372 (Neb. 1894) ("The right of trial within the county or district is a mere
personal privilege of the accused, and not conferred upon him from any consideration of public
policy."); State v. Albee, 61 N.H. 423, 426 (1881) (explaining vicinage right as "a protection to the
citizen against the power of the state").
189. See supratext accompanying notes 101-07.
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protecting defendants, if not more so."'
Although this scholarly emphasis is new, much of the historical
evidence that supports it is not. While most vicinage provisions in early
19 1
American constitutions were expressed in terms of defendants' rights,
some were not, 92 and there are scattered quotations from the Founding
93
generation and before that take a more community-centered approach.
Article III of the Constitution, for instance, requires jury trials without
mentioning criminal defendants, which suggests that jury trials are a
structural necessity, rather than a benefit for defendants. 194 Similar
tidbits are found scattered in the judicial record over the next two
centuries, 95 and the new scholarship amplified this latent communitycentered view.
The seminal work in this new wave of vicinage scholarship is Drew
Kershen's 1976-77 two-part article, Vicinage.' 96 The main purpose of
Kershen's article was to rescue vicinage from being disregarded in favor
of, or subsumed into, venue. 97 In the process of untangling vicinage and
venue, Kershen made a strong argument in favor of the community190. See generally Engel, supra note 88; Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86; Kershen, Vicinage
II, supra note 17.
191. See supra notes 104, 107, and text accompanying note 101 (quoting constitutions of
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont).
192. See supra notes 105, 107 (quoting constitutions of Georgia and Maryland); see also Engel,
supra note 88, at 1688 (noting that early version of Sixth Amendment did not phrase vicinage in
terms of defendants' rights).
193. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1673-92 (presenting historical evidence supporting communitycentered account); Kershen, Vicinage I, supranote 86, at 838-40 (discussing Founding-era concerns
about ensuring local popular participation in adjudication); cf Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a
Community Voice: The Casefor Half-and-HalfJuries in Racially-ChargedCriminal Cases, 28 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 12-27 (1994) (describing English history of jury from community-centered
perspective).
194. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Akhil Reed Amar has argued persuasively that this should
have been taken to require jury trials as a matter of the community's right, not the defendants',
though he recognized that the Supreme Court disagrees. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as
a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196-99 (1991).

195. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("Community participation in the
administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but
is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system."); State v. Lewis,
55 S.E. 600, 609 (N.C. 1906) (Connor, J., concurring) (noting that in addition to defendants' rights,
local grand juries "placed upon the people of each county or neighborhood the responsibility for
securing a fair, firm, and just administration of the law, detection and punishment of the guilty, and
protection of the innocent").
196. Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86; Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 17; see Murphy, supra
note 162, at 1087 (describing community-centered benefits of vicinage as "newly recognized").
197. Kershen, Vicinage I, supra note 86, at 804.
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centered vision of vicinage. He argued that community interest, among
other things, distinguished vicinage from the more party-centered
concept of venue.! 98 Subsequent scholarship, most recently that of Akhil
Reed Amar and Steven Engel, has amplified Kershen's communitycentered approach to vicinage and located additional support for this
approach in the historical record. 199 Some judicial opinions have taken
notice of the community-centered theory as well.2 °°
The basic idea of the community-centered approach is that local juries
enable communities to govern themselves by allowing them to set their
own standards for criminal conduct through acquittals and convictions.
If local juries are not used to decide cases-if people other than local
citizens1adjudicate the case-the community loses this ability to govern
20
itself.
The community-centered account of vicinage is persuasive as a matter
of theory (i.e., it sounds nice), but there is little doubt that the defendantcentered account remains the predominant rationale for local juries.
Scholars who push the community-centered approach are right to point
out that it deserves consideration, but any assertion that it is the principal

198. Kershen's article makes these points in several places, but does so in the most focused way
in Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 17, at 83-94.
199. See AmAR, supranote 122, at 83-110; Engel, supra note 88. See generally Zalman & Gates,
supranote 85 (advocating community-centered vision ofjuries of the vicinage).
200. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96, 100 (1970) (stating, in case denigrating
vicinage as not inherent part of jury trial, that "the essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the
interposition between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of
laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group's
determination of guilt or innocence"); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n.15 (1968)
(stating that jury in capital cases expresses "conscience of the community," and that "one of the
most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link
between contemporary community values and the penal system"); Hernandez v. Municipal Court,
781 P.2d 547, 548 n.1 (Cal. 1989) (in bank) ("Although the vicinage right is assertable by a
defendant in a criminal trial, in the present day criminal justice system the vicinage requirement also
protects the right of the offended community to pass judgment in criminal matters."); id. at 559
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (discussing benefits to stricken community of local trials); see also
People v. Tamble, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) ("Although the vicinage right is
assertable by a defendant in a criminal trial, it also protects the right of the offended community to
pass judgment in criminal matters."); Engel, supra note 88, at 1662 n.16 (citing recent communitycentered judicial opinions); Murphy, supra note 162, at 1087-88 (describing manifestations of
community-centered view in recent case law).
201. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. Among the other evidence supporting the
community-centered version is that requiring local trials does not necessarily benefit the defendant,
who may be from somewhere else, or who may not want the affected community to be the ones
judging him. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1694-95 (discussing contrast between defendants' rights
view and reality of vicinage rules).
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reason for juries is an exaggeration. 202 A rigorous proof of the
subordinate status of the community-centered approach is beyond the
scope of this Article, but the treatment of buffer statutes in American
case law gives at least one example of the fact that the communitycentered notion of juries is very weak in practice.
It does not appear from the case law that courts have been presented
with community-centered arguments about vicinage in buffer cases. In
cases where courts have affirmed buffer statutes, the communitycentered approach (which is incompatible with buffer statutes) obviously
did not persuade them, but none of these cases even engages the
community-centered argument.2 °3 This suggests, if not proves, that they
were not raised by any party. In other words, for courts affirming buffer
statutes, the community-centered concept of vicinage is irrelevant.
The scarcity of the community-centered approach to vicinage in the
case law reflects the changing nature of the jury. The vicinage
requirement was a self-evident sine qua non of juries back when few
people traveled and jurors were local witnesses. Juries remained local,
however, even after the juror's role became that of the impartial blank
slate. 204 The justification for maintaining local juries was more a matter
of administrative convenience than democratic policy,

20 5

not least

because the self-governing nature of juries faded when juries were
202. Indeed, even Steven Engel admits as much. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1661-62. 1 have
been guilty of promoting the community-centered notion of juries without fully wrestling with the
limited appeal that this view has had to courts. See Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felonsfrom Jury
Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 124-26 (2003) (discussing self-government theory ofjuries).
203. See, e.g., State v. Swainston, 676 P.2d 1153, 1154-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (basing decision
solely on longevity of statute and weight of authority in other states); Kaseris v. Justice Court, 144
P.2d 469, 470-71 (Idaho 1943) (approving buffer statute after cursory discussion); State v. Pugsley,
38 N.W. 498, 501 (Iowa 1888) (same); State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869), available at 1869
WL 2333, at *4-5 (approving buffer statutes as, at most, minor infringement on constitutional
vicinage rights of defendants and as necessary for effective law enforcement); State v. Lehman, 279
P. 283, 284 (Or. 1929) (approving buffer statute as not inconsistent with pro-defendant goals of
vicinage requirement); Commonwealth v. Collins, 47 Pa. C. 608, 610 (Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1919)
(describing vicinage as "most important of personal rights," but affirming buffer statute as not
inconsistent with vicinage); State ex rel. Brown v. Stewart, 19 N.W. 429, 433-34 (Wis. 1884)
(treating vicinage as "'right' of the 'accused,"' but in any case flexible enough to accommodate a
buffer statute).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
205. See, e.g., Taylor v. Gardiner, 11 R.I. 182, 184-85 (1875) ("The principal reason for trial in
the vicinage now is the convenience of parties and witnesses. Trials in this state are not confined to
the vicinage, except in actions relating to real estate or in criminal prosecutions."); Simon Stem,
Note, Between Local Knowledge and NationalPolitics:Debating Rationalesfor Jury Nullification
After Bushell's Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815, 1853-54 (2002) (discussing shifting justification for
juries of the vicinage).
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stripped of the power to judge the law and reduced to judging only
facts.2 °6 At the same time, the substantial expansion of individual rights
in the twentieth century meant that the persistence of jury trials (if not
strict-vicinage jury trials) became even more a matter of defendants'
rights than it had been before.2 °7 While vicinage persisted out of inertia,
convenience, and some lingering sense of self-government, its
enforcement as a matter of defendants' rights was bound to fade in favor
of defendants' much more robust and obvious interest in having an
impartial jury.20 8
Vicinage is one of the few provisions in the Bill of Rights that has not
been incorporated against the states. With no constituency both
interested in and able to fight for it, vicinage has been detached from
other provisions of the Sixth Amendment, which all have been
incorporated against the states.20 9 Vicinage has never been incorporated,
primarily because the United States Supreme Court has been unwilling
to declare that vicinage is central to the notion of what a jury is, or that
local juries are so central to the idea of a fair trial, that Sixth Amendment
vicinage must be expanded to reach state courts. 2 10 Not only do courts
treat vicinage as a defendant's right, rather than the community's right,
206. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
207. On the state of these matters before this transformation, there are a few early American
sources. As Joseph Story put it:
[T]he common law... required[] that the jury itself should come from the vicinage of the
place, where the crime was alleged to be committed. This was certainly a precaution, which,
however justifiable in an early and barbarous state of society, is little commendable in its more
advanced stages. It has been justly remarked, that in such cases to summon a jury, labouring
under local prejudices, is'laying a snare for their consciences; and though they should have
virtue and vigour of mind sufficient to keep them upright, the parties will grow suspicious, and
indulge other doubts of the impartiality of the trial.
3 STORY, supra note 118, § 1775 (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Holloway, 146 P. 1066,
1067-68 (N.M. 1914) (prioritizing impartiality over vicinage and taking defendant-centered
approach). But see Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 17, at 140-46 (arguing for enforcement of both
impartiality and vicinage). See generally Scott Kafker, Comment, The Right to Venue and the Right
to an ImpartialJury: Resolving the Conflict in the Federal Constitution, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 729
(1985) (arguing for placing impartiality above constitutional venue requirements).
208. See, e.g., Swainston, 676 P.2d at 1155 ("[T]he constitutional [vicinage] provision was not
designed to establish venue but rather to preserve the right to an unbiased jury."); see also GEORGE
P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 169 (1995) (arguing
that moving trials because of publicity violates spirit of Sixth Amendment); HELLER, supra note 86,
at 95 (discussing clash between impartiality and vicinage requirements); Engel, supra note 88, at
1662 (characterizing recent case law).
209. See supra note 122.
210. Cf Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 96 (1970) (using vicinage as example of common-law
right not implicit in inherent nature of jury trial); Price v. Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618, 626 (Cal.
2001) ("[V]icinage... is not a fundamental and essential feature of the right to jury trial.").
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but they do not accord much respect even to the former.
One area of jury composition that has received attention in recent
decades is the cross-section requirement. The cross-section requirement
mandates that the jury venire be representative of the community, 2 1 but
this obviously begs the question: What community? 212 While crosssection cases often discuss the minutiae of which groups are
"distinctive," these cases are routinely transferred to different venues
without regard for the principles of vicinage. So long as the jury
selection practices in the eventual forum do not discriminate against
women, black people, or other "distinctive" groups, the courts typically
do not intrude. 213 In cross-section cases, courts have focused (at least
implicitly) on due process, equal protection, and fairness-to the
defendant being tried and, only by extension, to the jury pool-instead
of focusing on vicinage. 2 14 If cross-section cases were at all about
getting vicinage right, one would expect to see defendants in cases like
Clarence Terrell's (where the state in question has no specific vicinage
guarantee) challenge buffer statutes on cross-section grounds. None
have. This is not to say, of course, that defendants could not or should
not bring such challenges, even if this would entail rewriting the law of
the cross-section right.21 5
In all, courts do not take vicinage very seriously. In the rare cases in
which they do, moreover, they treat it as a defendant's right. For this
reason, there is little basis to conclude that the negative impact of buffer
statutes on a community's right to try its own criminal defendants would
move the courts much. As the next Part shows, the case law indicates
exactly that: Courts have not in fact been swayed by vicinage arguments.
B.

The Rejection of County-Line Buffer Statutes... on Other Grounds
Many courts have struck down buffer statutes. All such cases

211. For a more detailed description and critique of the cross-section standard, see Kalt, supra
note 202, at 75-88.
212. See Alexander, supra note 122, at 273 ("The right to a jury representing a cross-section of
the community is central to the right to a fair trial. The issue is how to define the 'community' to be
represented.")
213. See Kalt, supra note 202, at 81 (discussing application of cross-section requirement).
214. See id. at 75-88.
215. See Alexander, supra note 122, at 294 (concluding that vicinage must be taken seriously if
cross-section right is to mean anything); Engel, supra note 88, at 1673, 1701 ("The public vicinage
right is implicit in... the cross-section requirement .... ).
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occurred between 1860 and 1930,216 and therefore do not provide much
direct evidence of the current strength of the community-centered theory
of vicinage. These cases do show, however, that even during those
decades, the community-centered approach was moribund.217 The fact
that the more recent scholarly revitalization of the community-centered
theory has not been accompanied by increased challenges to buffer
statutes on community-centered grounds does not bode well for the
current strength of the theory either.2 18
The largest set of anti-buffer decisions from these decades were based
on state constitutional provisions that required trial by a local jury, with
"local" meaning "drawn from the county of the crime. 219 When state
constitutions spoke of juries of the "vicinage," or the "district" in which
the crime was committed, courts usually found the buffer statutes
acceptable because vicinage is a vague term, and buffers represent only
one way of drawing district lines.22 ° When provisions were specific,
though, and required juries of the "county" of the crime, many (but not
all) courts found that the buffer statutes had to yield.221 Most of these
decisions were purely positivist, as befit the era in which they were
made. As as one court put it:
It may be that [buffers] would work no inconvenience, and be
greatly promotive of a rigid enforcement of the Criminal
Code... but it is enough for the present to say this is not
warranted by the constitution.., and our opinion of its wisdom
or convenience can not in the slightest affect the question of its
obligatory force.2 2
Such courts overturned buffer statutes because they conflicted with a

216. See supra note 40.
217. While Kershen injected new vigor into the community-centered argument, he did not purport
to be making a novel argument; rather, in the finest traditions of the common-law, he emphasized
ideas that had always been there but had faded. See Kershen, Vicinage II, supra note 17, at 85-94.
218. See supra text accompanying note 203.
219. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 170-71.
221. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
222. Buckrice v. People, 110 I11.29, 34 (1884). For other purely positivist opinions, see Kaseris
v. Justice Court, 144 P.2d 469, 473-75 (Idaho 1943) (Dunlap, J., dissenting); State v. Harris, 31 So.
782, 786 (La. 1902) (Blanchard, J., dissenting), relied on by State v. Montgomery, 38 So. 949, 949
(La. 1905) (striking down buffer statute); State v. Chalikes, 170 N.E. 653, 653-54 (Ohio 1930)
(striking down buffer statute); State v. Lowe, 21 W. Va. 782, 793 (1883) (striking down buffer
statute, "however convenient this statute may be"). For a legal realist attack on these court
decisions, see Comment, 25 ILL. L. REv. 732, 734 (1931).
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specific state constitutional provision, and no deeper analysis of vicinage
requirements was needed. In the face of the obvious argument that
buffers were at worst a de minimis violation,223 these courts typically
replied with slippery-slope arguments,224 or limited the statutes'
application to crimes of uncertain location.225
On the few occasions when courts went into more depth-when they
explored why vicinage was important, and what was wrong with
allowing buffers-the community-centered view was nowhere to be
found in the court's analysis. Instead, these case discussions were cast in
terms either of protecting the rights of defendants, or protecting the
integrity of the common law for its own sake.226 In one typical case, In
re McDonald, the court explained:
It has ever been esteemed as among our most valuable common
law heritages to enjoy the right of trial by jury.... [The law]
has, therefore, ever been zealous to accord to [the citizen] the
privilege of a trial at home, among his neighbors. So, in criminal
prosecutions, while the privilege is usually accorded to the
accused to take a change of venue, in order that he may escape
local prejudice and passion, and to secure a fair and impartial
trial, it does not recognize the right of the state to change the
venue. Whereas, if the statute in question is valid, it is plain to
be seen how the ancient privilege of the citizen in this respect
may be stricken down by the state, and the state secure by

223. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 14 Minn. 447 (1869), available at 1869 WL 2333, at *4
(affirming buffer statute as de minimis).
224. See Buckrice, 110 111.at 34.
If this may be done as to one hundred rods of territory, why may it not be done as to one mile?
And if it may be done as to one mile, why may it not be done as to the entire county, and thus
drag men for trial to Cook or JoDaviess county for offences committed in Alexander or Pulaski
county?
Id.; see also Dougan v. State, 30 Ark. 41, 43 (1875) (making slippery slope argument); Harris, 31

So. at 786 (Blanchard, J., dissenting) (same), relied on by Montgomery, 38 So. at 949; In re
McDonald, 19 Mo. App. 370, 376 (1885) (same); Armstrong v. State, 41 Tenn. 338, 342 (1860)
(same). But see, e.g., State v. Lehman, 279 P. 283, 285 (Or. 1929) (rejecting slippery slope
argument).
225. See, e.g., Dougan, 30 Ark. at 43.
226. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 197 P. 712, 714 (Okla. Crim. App. 1921) (striking down buffer
statute due to fear of prosecutorial forum-shopping); Lowe, 21 W. Va. at 793 (striking down buffer
statute and casting vicinage right in terms of defendants' rights); Constitutionalityof Statute, supra
note 51, at 1038 (noting cases striking down buffers as based on offenders' rights); cf Swart v.
Kimball, 5 N.W. 635, 637-639 (Mich. 1880) (finding vicinage right inherent in notion of jury and
discussing right in terms of defendants' interests).
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indirection a change of venue.227
As another court apologetically stated in 1860, as it struck down a buffer
statute: "The worst criminals have their rights. 2 28
If the community-centered view of local juries really mattered to
courts, it would be a counterweight to impartiality, instead of a secondtier value below it.229 Litigants and courts would try to vindicate both
interests. Litigants would challenge buffer statutes on the grounds that
they offend an important constitutional value, and courts in some states
would agree with them.230 This is not the world we live in, however.
Defendants like Clarence Terrell and their attorneys do not think of
challenging buffer statutes when they are applied against them, 231 even if
they are in states with arguably strong constitutional vicinage
requirements.2 32 Defendants and their attorneys think that as long as the
jury is impartial, there is nothing to complain about-not successfully,
anyway.
Though the community-centered view of vicinage provides a
powerful basis for rejecting buffer statutes, 233 it is nevertheless
unsurprising that it was not raised in the cases challenging buffer
statutes. For one thing, no one represented the interest of the community
in these cases. The prosecution, normally the representative of the
people, is the one applying the statutes in these cases, and thus is the one
defending them. The defendant who opposed the buffer statute had a
sufficiently powerful defendant-centered argument without resorting to
less potent and less direct community-centered ones.
227. McDonald, 19 Mo. App. at 377. The McDonald Court also feared prosecutorial abuse. Id. at
377-78.
The prosecution.., sometimes stimulated by private ambition and personal spite, could select
for such prosecution that one most inimical to the accused and most inconvenient to his
witnesses, and farthest removed, at the place of trial, from and least in sympathy with, his
neighborhood and home influence, wrought, perhaps, by a hitherto unblemished, reputation."
Id.
228. Armstrong, 41 Tenn. at 342.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
230. This is exactly what happened in those cases between 1860 and 1930 in which buffer
statutes were struck down. See supra note 40. It would appear, however, that the states interested in
interpreting their constitutional vicinage requirements this strictly have already done so.
231. See supra notes 5-9, 12 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., supra note 48 (mentioning South Dakota, the strongest example of this curious
failure to challenge buffers with a strong constitutional vicinage requirement).
233. At least one court used a different sort of community-centered argument to affirm a buffer
statute, noting the community's interest in the effective prosecution of crime. State v. Robinson, 14
Minn. 447 (1869), available at 1869 WL 2333, at *5.
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This same pattern is reflected in the much more heavily (and more
recently) litigated area of discrimination in jury selection. In cases where
prospective jurors are excluded because of their race, the person
challenging the practice is almost always a criminal defendant who
asserts that the exclusion violates his right to a proper jury trial.234 These
defendants argue, at most, indirectly on behalf of the excluded jurors,
whose rights are implicated most directly, but who are not before the
court. 235 Relatedly, in cross-section cases, the most direct interest-that
of the community and all its members to govern themselves on equal
terms-is either left unspoken or is vindicated only indirectly by a
defendant arguing for his own rights.236
While the community-centered approach is not explicitly mentioned
in the buffer-statute case law, this does not necessarily mean that it
would be irrelevant to a court to whom it was argued. Nevertheless, the
arguments that the parties make are a function of the posture of the cases
themselves. While jury selection and cross-section cases have managed
to bring in community interests, they have done so by identifying
individuals whose rights are affected: the particular excluded jurors. In
buffer cases, no jurors are harmed as individuals, and so the communitycentered argument in favor of vicinage offers no real basis for an
argument from a notion of individual rights, only harder-to-represent
collective rights.231
In the sources reviewed for this Article, there is simply no evidence
that the community-centered view of vicinage has been raised in any
cases challenging buffer statutes. Criminal defendants and their
attorneys are not known for being shy about raising novel arguments in
their cases. Here, however, even they are restrained, which suggests
either that the community-centered view is not on their radar screens, or
that even criminal defendants and their attorneys recognize that a
community-centered argument for a local jury has no chance of success.

234. See Kalt, supra note 202, at 72 (discussing phenomenon).
235. See, e.g., Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 400 (1998) (hearing white defendant's
challenge to exclusion of black would-be grand jurors).
236. See Engel, supra note 88, at 1710-11 (discussing standing issues in vicinage cases).
237. Cf Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissing case for lack of
standing after construing Second Amendment as providing only collective rights).

Vicinage and Criminal Buffers
IV. NOT CROSSING EIGHT MILE: PRESERVING JURIES OF
THE VICINAGE
When Clarence Terrell was accused of committing a crime in Detroit,
he should have been tried in Detroit before a Detroit jury, which would
have done a better job, and which should have had the right to decide a
case within its borders. Because a buffer statute was available, however,
Terrell was tried across the county line before a suburban jury, contrary
to the common-law tradition favoring local juries, and in contravention
of sound policy. Even if his state had had a constitutional provision
guaranteeing a trial in the county or district where the crime was
committed, he might still have faced trial in a foreign county, and it still
would have been for no good reason. Clarence Terrell's chances of
acquittal might have been better in Detroit, but his were not the only
interests at stake. Detroit also had an interest in having its citizens
adjudicate Terrell's case and govern themselves through this
adjudication. Nobody argued that Terrell's and Detroit's rights were
violated, however, and if anybody had, he or she would likely have lost.
For a bad statute that violates a good principle, this solicitude is hard to
defend.
On the other hand, most states do not have buffer statutes, and they do
just fine without them. Defendants are either unaware or uninterested in
the possibility of challenging buffer statutes where they do exist. Courts
are thus not presented with these challenges, and, somewhat circularly,
would likely not affirm such challenges if they were made. That said,
there is no reason that state lawmakers cannot simply repeal these laws.
Indeed, they should do just that.
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